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1 In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
recognizes that “by any measure, HFT is a dominant component of the current
market structure and likely to affect nearly all aspects of its performance”
(Securities and Exchange Commission, 2010; Release No. 34e61358; File No.
S7-02-10). In 2012 the SEC expressed serious concerns about the potential
impact of HFT on market quality (see, “SEC May Ticket Speeding Traders,”
The Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2012). In Europe, the latest MiFID II
“will introduce specific provisions designed to ensure that high frequency
trading (HFT) does not have an adverse effect on market quality or integrity.”
Under MiFID II, HFT firms engaging in proprietary trading need to be
authorized by exchanges. See “MiFID II e What is changing,” Financial
Conduct Authority, September 12, 2014, available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/
firms/markets/international-markets/mifid-ii/what-is-changing, accessed on
July 17, 2015.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2016.09.006
2214-8450/Copyright © 2016, Borsa _Istanbul Anonim S¸irketi. Production and hos
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).question is whether HFT improves market liquidity (Jones,
2013). Researchers generally report that HFT improves market
quality by narrowing bid-ask spreads (Jovanovic & Menkveld,
2011; Malinova, Park, & Riordan, 2013) and supplying
liquidity in transactions when spreads are wide (Carrion, 2013).
Others argue that the liquidity provided by HFT is illusory and
difficult to access because it is usually cancelled within an
exceptionally short period of time (i.e., in milliseconds), and has
been dubbed as “phantom liquidity.”2 A few researchers have
focused on the liquidity-taking behaviour of HFT firms, with
analyses on their liquidity provision during transactions
(Brogaard, Hendershott, & Riordan, 2014). However, while the
preceding studies are important, an understanding about the
liquidity provided by HFT firms (hereafter, HFT liquidity) via
their posted orders on the limit order book can potentially
contribute much to the ongoing debate about the role played by
HFT firms in modern securities markets.3 For example, issues2 See, “Concept Release on EquityMarket Structure,” Securities and Exchange
Commission, 2010, p. 50; and “High-Frequency Trading: Background, Concerns,
and Regulatory Developments,” Congressional Research Service, 2014, p. 19.
3 Recently the European Securities and Markets Authority calls for further
research to “assess the actual contribution of HFT to liquidity.” See, “High-
frequency trading in EU equity markets,” European Securities and Markets
Authority, November 1, 2014.
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common among HFT firms, whether HFT firms provide liquidity
via larger orders than other investors, whether HFTfirms increase
or decrease liquidity supply during periods of high volatility, can
only be addressed via an analysis of how HFT firms interact with
the limit order book. In this paper, we use novel data which
identifiesHFTorderswithin a limit order book to directly address
some concerns raised by the opponents of HFT.4
Amihud (2002) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) demon-
strate the importance of market liquidity. In today's securities
markets, HFT firms have largely assumed the role of tradi-
tional human market makers (Menkveld, 2013), so that it is
especially interesting to understand how they provide liquidity
via limit orders. We note that limit orders are an important
source of market liquidity (Biais, Foucault, & Moinas, 2015),
and recent advances in trading technology have significantly
reduced the costs to monitor and alter limit orders (Hasbrouck
and Saar 2013; Jones, 2013), making limit order trading more
attractive. Jovanovic and Menkveld (2011) and Hoffmann
(2014) suggest that compared with non-HFT firms, HFT
firms are more likely to supply liquidity via limit orders since
their superior technology can reduce adverse selection risk in
market making.5 Finally, the widely-adopted maker-taker
pricing by exchanges around the world provide additional
incentives for traders to trade via limit orders.
In this study, we first reconstruct the LOBs for a sample of
116 stocks traded on Nasdaq during the first quarter of 2011.
Then, using information on 26 trading firms which are iden-
tified by Nasdaq as mainly engaging in HFT activities, we
provide a detailed analysis on their liquidity provision activ-
ities via limit order placement, including executed and
cancelled orders. To the best of our knowledge, such an
analysis of HFT limit orders has not been conducted before.64 Some researchers examine the aggregated impact of HFT liquidity on
market quality using market events that affect the trading of the high frequency
market making firms (Friederich & Payne, 2015; Hagstr€omer, Norden, &
Zhang, 2014; Jovanovic & Menkveld 2011; Malinova et al., 2013). Unlike
these researchers, we examine the dynamics of HFT liquidity on the LOB.
5 Research has shown that in a quote driven market, specialists can be
informed (Ready, 1999) due to their exclusive access to the information about
floor brokers (Benveniste, Marcus, & Wilhelm, 1992) and the LOB (Harris &
Panchapagesan, 2005; Madhavan & Panchapagesan, 2000). Such privileges
become less apparent whenmost equities markets today have an electronic LOB.
6 Brogaard et al. (2014) (BHR 2014) also conduct some analysis on the
liquidity provision by HFT firms. Our study differs from BHR 2014 in a
number of ways. First, since the data used in BHR 2014 are limited to
transactions, their study focuses on the effects of liquidity-taking behaviour of
HFT firms. Second, the findings of BHR 2014 on the liquidity provision by
HFT firms are based on limit orders executed in transactions. In our study, we
provide a detailed analysis of the liquidity provision by HFT and non-HFT
firms for all limit orders in the top 50 price levels of the LOB. As a result,
the policy implications of our study complement those of BHR 2014. More
recently, in another concurrent and complementary paper, Brogaard et al.
(2015) examine the impact of HFT limit orders on price discovery; in
contrast, our focus is on liquidity provision and we provide a more detailed
analysis on the dynamics of the LOB. While our HFT classifications originate
from Nasdaq, they use algorithms to classify firms as HFT firms (for an
analysis of potential issues induced by classification algorithms for HFT firms,
see “Equity Market Structure Literature Review Part II: High Frequency
Trading”, Securities and Exchange Commission, 2014).We find that the average size of HFT limit orders is smaller
than that of the limit orders from other traders, whom we
define as the non-HFT firms. However, the median sizes of
limit orders are similar between groups. The limit order
cancellation ratios are also very similar between HFT firms
and non-HFT firms. The limit order execution ratios are
smaller for HFT firms when we examine limit orders sub-
mitted to the top three price levels of the LOB. However, when
we include all limit orders submitted to the top 50 price levels
of the LOB, the order execution ratios become similar between
the two groups. In general, our results show that the commonly
perceived special features of HFT liquidity provision, such as
smaller order size and being less accessible when needed by
liquidity demanders, are not unique to HFT liquidity.
A large number of limit orders submitted and cancelled
within a short period of time can increase the uncertainty of
liquidity and affect wealth distribution among traders.7 The
rise of such fleeting orders is widely attributed to the increase
of HFT, but there is little evidence to support this perception.
We analyse this issue and find that the time that a limit order
rests on the LOB is significantly shorter for the limit orders of
HFT firms than for those of non-HFT firms. For stocks with
large, medium, and small market capitalizations (hereafter,
large-, medium-, and small-cap stocks), the median time a
limit order rests at the top 50 price levels of the LOB before an
execution or cancellation is 1.85, 6.02, and 18.30 s for HFT
firms, and 4.12, 8.98, and 22.43 s for non-HFT firms,
respectively. For limit orders submitted to the top three price
levels of the LOB, the median time to cancellation of HFT
firm (non-HFT firm) limit orders is 0.53 (3.02), 2.15 (3.47),
and 6.84 (4.48) seconds for large-, medium-, and small-cap
stocks, respectively. These results confirm the common
belief that HFT liquidity rests on the LOB for a shorter period
of time than non-HFT liquidity.
In a closer examination of the distribution of limit orders
across the LOB we find that HFT firms gradually reduce their
liquidity on the LOB at price levels further away from the top
of the LOB. Intraday analysis shows that HFTs place limit
orders on the LOB exhibiting a pattern consistent with a
strategic behaviour of a liquidity provider in the presence of
market volatility. Following Næsand Skjeltorp (2006), we
further calculate the slope of the LOB for the limit orders of
HFT firms and non-HFT firms and find that HFT firms stra-
tegically place more liquidity further away from the top of the
LOB ahead of an increase in price volatility. Our tests on the
impact of order submission and order cancellation reveal that
across all stock groups, HFT firms tend to cancel buy (sell)
limit orders ahead of a short-term price decrease (increase),
while for non-HFT firms the relation is the opposite for large-
cap stocks and significantly weaker for the medium- and7 Hasbrouck (2013) documents that the volatility of quote changes at 50 ms
intervals are about three times of the volatility measured over 27-min intervals
and the uncertainty associated with short-term liquidity provides a significant
advantage to liquidity takers with faster speed. Baruch and Glosten (2013, p.
28) provide some theoretical explanations for the rationale behind the fleeting
orders.
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HFT firms, HFT firms are more capable of using order
cancellation to manage the risk of trading with limit orders,
which results in their liquidity being more informed
(Brogaard, Hendershott, & Riordan, 2015).8
Liquidity providers must maintain a balance between the
adverse selection costs and opportunity costs of trading.
Agents incur adverse selection costs if the liquidity they pro-
vide is taken by informed traders, and incur opportunity costs
if their orders are not executed and the price subsequently
moves unfavourably. We note that compared with HFT firms,
non-HFT firms are more likely to trade for exogenous reasons
that are not directly related to short-term stock performance.9
For example, a mutual fund manager can trade based on
fundamental analysis or execute a large order on behalf of a
client. Hence, for non-HFT firms, the opportunity costs (i.e.,
the possibility of a failure to execute an order because the
price subsequently moves away from the order), may outweigh
their concerns about being adversely selected.10 On the other
hand, HFT firms are professional traders who aim to maximize
trading profits. Therefore, relative to non-HFT firms, they can
be more focused on the management of adverse selection risk.
Thus, we hypothesize that it can be rational for non-HFT firms
to purposely expose their limit orders to higher adverse se-
lection risks if they can achieve a better execution rate in re-
turn. To test this hypothesis, we compare the opportunity costs
and adverse selection costs of limit orders submitted and
cancelled by HFT firms and non-HFT firms.11 We find that
non-HFT firms incur significantly higher adverse selection
costs than HFT firms, while the opportunity costs of the limit
orders for HFT firms are significantly higher than the limit8 We find that the submission of buy (sell) limit orders is followed by an
increase (decrease) in short-term prices. This effect is stronger for non-HFT
firms than HFT firms. Since the total volume of limit orders submitted by
non-HFT firms is significantly higher than that of HFTs firms, these results are
consistent with the conjecture that limit order placement affects subsequent
price movements. However, our results on price behaviours following order
cancellation by HFT firms and non-HFT firms are the opposite. Given that the
limit order cancellation ratios are similar between these firms, our results on
order cancellation are unlikely to be driven by the same reason as the results
for order submission.
9 The exogenous factors, including liquidity demand, financing costs,
hedging demand, and other personal uses of the asset (e.g., arbitrages), are
considered as ex post gains from trade in theoretical trading models (Duffie,
2010; Pagnotta and Philippon 2012).
10 Economides and Schwartz (1995) provide further empirical evidence
supporting this analysis. They survey 150 professional investors with $1.54
trillion in equity under management, and find that the majority of these in-
vestors rank non-execution risk ahead of adverse selection risk as the most
important drawback of using limit orders (Economides & Schwartz, 1995,
Table 11).
11 As explained in Section 1, the opportunity costs are defined as the sub-
sequent price movements following a limit order submission, which are
different from the price pressure examined by Hendershott and Menkveld
(2014). In Hendershott and Menkveld (2014) the price pressure is defined as
the deviations from the efficient price that a market intermediary pays to
mean-revert her inventory. The adverse selection costs of limit orders are
calculated as the signed returns of the bid-ask midpoint in a 30-s (short-term)
and 300-s (longer term) period after order submission.orders of non-HFT firms, confirming that both are acting
strategically for their respective purposes of trading.
We also compare the opportunity costs of limit orders
cancelled by both groups. We find that the limit orders
cancelled by HFT firms have significantly lower opportunity
costs. Since our measure of opportunity costs is based on the
immediate price movements after order submissions, the op-
portunity costs can be interpreted as the information content of
the limit orders (i.e., positive (negative) opportunity costs
means market prices tend to move in the same (opposite) di-
rection as the limit orders, should the order be executed).
Therefore, our results indicate that HFT firms are more
capable of identifying and cancelling their limit orders that
later become cheap liquidity. Our difference-in-differences
tests (comparing opportunity cost differentials for cancelled
and submitted orders across HFT and non-HFT firms) confirm
that liquidity provided by HFT firms has greater information
content.
In our sample, about 30% of the limit orders submitted to
the top 50 price levels of the LOB emanate from the 26 HFT
firms. When markets become increasingly reliant on voluntary
high-frequency liquidity providers, the increased liquidity may
come at the cost of market stability. Hasbrouck (2013) dem-
onstrates how quote volatility affects traders with heteroge-
neous trading speeds, while Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and
Tuzun (2014) and the CFTC/SEC's 2010 Report on the May
6, 2010 flash crash reveal how high-frequency liquidity pro-
viders may exit the market and cause further disruptions
during extreme market conditions. Unlike designated market
makers, voluntary liquidity providers may withdraw during
volatile periods but, on the other hand, liquidity is also more
expensive when markets are more volatile, which represents a
profit opportunity for liquidity suppliers if they can manage
the risk.12 With superior trading technologies, HFT liquidity
providers are better positioned to manage this risk and earn the
additional risk-adjusted profits. Consistent with this analysis,
we find that HFTs net increase the supply of liquidity in large-
and medium-cap stocks when market volatility increases, and
provide more liquidity in large cap stocks during periods of
extreme market volatilities. We also find that following shocks
in market liquidity imbalances, both HFT and non-HFT
liquidity providers place their limit orders further away from
the top of the LOB, which is consistent with the behaviour of
rational voluntary liquidity providers. However, the impact of
liquidity imbalance shocks on HFT liquidity providers is
significantly smaller and diminishes more quickly than that on
non-HFT liquidity providers. Our results thus suggest that12 Hendershott and Riordan (2013) provide some evidence suggesting that
algorithmic traders tend to consume liquidity when bid-ask spreads are narrow
and supply when they are wide. Our study is different from Hendershott and
Riordan (2013) who focus on algorithmic trading that includes both agency
and proprietary trading, whereas our study considers the trading of firms
identified as proprietary HFT traders. The purpose of trading for institutions
with large positions can be vitally different from that of proprietary traders.
Exclusively analysing the behaviour of the latter can shed important light on
regulatory concerns.
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providers, HFT firms enhance market quality.
Our study has important implications for the regulation of
HFT. Recently there has been a widespread call for tightened
regulations on HFT.13 Our evidence should help market reg-
ulators to better understand the role played by HFT firms as
liquidity suppliers during normal trading conditions, as well as
the economics underlying the differences in the limit order
placement behaviour between HFT firms and non-HFT firms.
Our results also bring into question the effectiveness of reg-
ulations that target some features such as fleeting orders
commonly believed to be associated with HFT liquidity, which
as we show are shared by non-HFT liquidity under the current
trading environment.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we
describe the sample data. Section 2 provides the empirical
results and analysis. We conclude and provide the policy im-
plications of our study in Section 3.
1. Data
Nasdaq provides the full order and transaction data for
120 stocks traded on the Nasdaq markets over the first
quarter of 2011. The 120 stocks are stratified by market
capitalization and listing venues, as examined by Brogaard
et al. (2014). Three stocks were delisted before the sample
period (BARE, CHTT, and KTII), and another stock is
delisted (BW) during the sample period. Therefore, we
delete these four stocks, giving a final sample of 116 stocks;
59 are listed on the NYSE and 57 are Nasdaq listed. We
further sort the sample stocks by market capitalization and
divide them into large (top 40 stocks), medium (medium 40
stocks), and small (final 36 stocks) size groups. Appendix 1
contains the list of stocks and their market capitalizations.
Over the sample period, there are 26 HFT firms identified
individually by Nasdaq based on their trading behaviour and
customers. We classify traders into HFT firms and non-HFT
firms based on whether they are included in the Nasdaq HFT
firm list.14
The order and transaction data are time stamped to the
nanosecond with buy/sell indicators and trader IDs. Using
these data we reconstruct the LOBs of each of the sample
stocks over the sample period, and generate five datasets: the13 In the United States, there are a large number of market regulators and law
enforcement agencies currently investigating HFT activities, including the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Justice (DOJ), the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), the Office of the New York Attorney General, and the
Massachusetts Secretary of Commerce (see, Shorter & Miller, 2014). Legal
actions were also launched against exchanges for their alleged granting of
unfair advantages to HFTs. See “High-Frequency Trading Leads to Lawsuit
Against Exchanges,” The Wall Street Journal, September 8, 2014. In Europe,
the Prudential Regulation Authority in the United Kingdom recently started
testing “whether companies' controls around algorithmic, or automated,
trading are fit for purpose” (see “High-frequency trading faces tougher Bank of
England scrutiny,” Financial Times, May 15, 2015).
14 Brogaard et al. (2014) provide additional explanation on the sample stock
selection and the classification of HFT firms by Nasdaq.LOB snapshots dataset, the limit order traffic dataset, the limit
order size dataset, the limit order survival time dataset, and the
limit order opportunity costs dataset; these datasets are
described below.
Each trading day is divided into 5-s intervals. A snapshot of
the LOB is taken at the end of each time interval; the LOB
snapshots dataset contains the aggregated limit order volume
placed by HFT firms and non-HFT firms at each of the top 50
price levels of the LOB at the end of each time interval. The
limit order traffic dataset contains the total buy and total sell
limit order volume submitted and cancelled by each group
during each time interval.
For each stock and trading day, the average and distribution
quartiles of the size of limit orders submitted and cancelled by
each group at the top 3, 4e10, 11e20, and 21e50 price levels
of the LOB are calculated and output to the limit order size
dataset. Similarly, for each stock and trading day, the volume-
weighted average and distribution quartiles of the time it takes
before a limit order is terminated, either by cancellation or by
trade, are calculated for the top 3, 4e10, 11e20, and 21e50
price levels of the LOB, and output to the limit order survival
time dataset.
Limit orders face opportunity costs if they are not executed
and price subsequently moves away from them. Previous
literature focuses on the execution costs of trades (e.g.,
Bessembinder & Kaufman, 1997a, b; Chan & Lakonishok,
1997; Keim and Madhavan, 1997). Harris and Hasbrouck
(1996) examine the execution costs for limit orders. They
define the ex post execution costs as the difference between
the execution price and the same-side quote price 5 min later.
Griffiths, Smith, Turnbull, and White (2000) calculate the
opportunity costs as the change in the midquotes from
immediately before the limit order arrives at the LOB to the
time it is cancelled, plus additional execution costs assuming
the order is then resubmitted as a market order. However, it is
assumed in this method that the trader is pre-committed to the
execution of the order and has to trade as soon as the limit
order fails to execute. In the current HFT environment, pro-
fessional traders frequently submit, cancel, and modify their
limit orders based on a variety of trading strategies; hence,
they are unlikely to have pre-commitment on the quantity and
time that they have to trade with.
Keeping in mind the above observations, we follow Perold
(1988) and Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) and
define the opportunity costs of a limit order as:
Opportunitycostst ¼ qt
ðmtþnmtÞ
mt
; ð1Þ
where mtþn is the NBBO midpoint n seconds after the order
submission or cancellation, and qt is a buy sell indicator that
equals to 1 (1) if it is a buy (sell) limit order. For each stock
day, limit orders are sorted by order size and a limit order
submitted or cancelled is classified as a small, medium or
large order if the order size falls into the top 5% (large-size
group), between 50% and 95% (medium-size group), and the
bottom 50% (small-size group) in the size distribution,
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opportunity costs of passive orders are higher when they are
placed more aggressively on the LOB. Thus, for limit orders
placed at price levels equal to or better than the best quotes on
the Nasdaq LOB, the average and distribution quartiles of
opportunity costs over a 30-s (short-term) and 180-s (long-
term) time periods are calculated for HFT and non-HFT limit
orders of different order size categories, and output to the limit
order opportunity costs dataset.15
2. Results and analysis2.1. The characteristics of HFT firms' limit orders
2.1.1. Volume
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics of the limit or-
ders submitted and cancelled by HFT and non-HFT firms
across all sample stocks.16 Each trading day is divided into 5-
min intervals, and the table reports the average volume sub-
mitted and cancelled by each group at the top 50 price levels
of the LOB during the time interval. Panel A shows that HFT
firms (non-HFT firms) on average submit 85,845 (202,463)
shares of limit orders to the top 50 price levels of the LOB per
5-min interval per stock respectively, which indicates that over
the sample period the 26 HFT firms contribute about 30% of
the total liquidity on the LOB. Among the total limit orders
submitted by HFT firms (non-HFT firms), 67,092 shares
(125,225 shares) or 78% (62%) are submitted to the top three
price levels of LOB. This result indicates that relative to non-
HFT firms, HFT firms are more likely to supply liquidity to the
top of the LOB.17
Table 1, Panel B shows that the average limit order volumes
cancelled by both groups follow closely the volumes they
submit (i.e., the total volume cancelled by non-HFT firms is
greater than that by HFT firms, which tend to cancel more
closer to the top of the LOB). An interesting question, there-
fore, is which type of trader is more likely to cancel a limit
order? For each time interval, we calculate the cancellation
ratio as the total limit order volume cancelled divided by the
sum of limit order volume cancelled and submitted. Panel C
shows that the limit order cancellation ratios of both groups
are very high. For limit orders in the top three price levels of
LOB, the average cancellation ratio for HFT firms is 0.4862,
which is almost identical to the cancellation ratio of 0.4858 for
non-HFT firms. The average cancellation ratio for all limit15 We choose 30 s as the short-term time interval because as reported in Table
3 the average survival time of limit orders before cancellation is between 30
and 45 s.
16 In Appendix 2, we divide our sample stocks into small, medium, and large
groups based on their market capitalizations, and the statistics reported in
Table 1 are reproduced for each stock group.
17 During our sample period Nasdaq charges an excess message fee for limit
orders that are more than 0.2% outside of the NBBO, a band that is equivalent
to $0.09 based on the average price of $45 for our sample stocks. The sig-
nificant decrease in limit orders outside the top 10 price levels is consistent
with the notion that traders are sensitive to the increased costs for liquidity
provision.orders in the top 50 price levels is about 0.49 for both groups.
Panel D reports the average order execution ratio, which is
calculated as the total limit order volume executed divided by
the total limit order volume submitted. The execution ratio is
higher for non-HFT firms for orders in the top three price
levels of the LOB; however, when we include all orders at the
top 50 price levels, the difference between groups is
economically small.
The results on cancellation ratio are contradictory to the
common belief that relative to non-HFT firms, HFT firms are
more likely to cancel their orders. For example, in the SEC
Concept Release 2010 firms engaging in HFT are character-
ized by “… (4) the submission of numerous orders that are
cancelled shortly after submission” (SEC Concept Release
2010, p. 45). More recently, the SEC is reported to be
considering options to curb HFT, including “charging fees for
the myriad buy and sell orders that are later cancelled.”18 Our
results suggest that limit orders from non-HFT firms are
equally likely to be cancelled, and question the effectiveness
of charging order cancellation fees as a measure to restrict
HFT activities.
To further investigate order cancellation by HFT and non-
HFT firms, Fig. 1 shows the intraday order cancellation ra-
tios for the small-, medium-, and large-cap stocks. It is
apparent that the order cancellation ratios of both groups
closely follow each other throughout the trading day. The
cancellation ratios range between the levels of 0.48 and 0.5
for all stock groups, and are generally higher for smaller
stocks, which is consistent with the higher risk in the trading
of these stocks. An interesting result is the behaviour of the
cancellation ratio at the end of trading day. The cancellation
ratios of both groups decrease towards the end of trading
day; this decrease is more profound for non-HFT firms and
for smaller stocks. Since order cancellation at high fre-
quencies can serve as an effective tool to turn the nature of
limit orders from supplying liquidity to demanding liquidity
(Hasbrouck & Saar, 2009), a decrease in limit order
cancellation rate may indicate an increase in a trader's
intension to supply liquidity. To confirm this hypothesis, in
Appendix 3 we calculate the intraday net liquidity supply for
both groups, and find that there is a significant increase in net
liquidity provision by both at the end of trading day. The
pattern is consistent with the liquidity cancellation ratio
presented in Fig. 1. Brogaard (2010) finds that since HFT
firms typically maintain a zero end-of-day inventory, these
informed traders (Brogaard et al., 2014) initiate fewer trades
when it gets closer to the end of trading. Therefore, we
believe that the significant increase in liquidity supply
especially for non-HFT firms at the end of trading is a
strategic response to the reduced risk of trading against
informed liquidity-taking HFT firms.18 See, “SEC May Ticket Speeding Traders,” The Wall Street Journal,
February 23, 2012. In addition, exchanges also consider order cancellation fee
as an effective tool against HFT. For example, the Chicago Stock Exchange
has been trying to design an optimal order cancellation fee scheme to restrict
HFT. See, SEC File No. SR-CHX-2012-15.
Table 1
Limit order addition, cancellation and execution.
Top 3 Top 4 e 10 Top 11 e 20 All top 50 levels
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Panel A: Order addition (shares)
HFT 67,092 182,867 15,463 50,919 2581 19,847 85,845 235,665
Non-HFT 125,225 1,976,398 54,258 109,830 15,019 35,699 202,463 1,996,915
Panel B: Order cancellation (shares)
HFT 62,358 167,514 15,216 51,471 2786 20,383 81,189 222,793
Non-HFT 118,082 1,972,498 50,799 98,982 14,929 32,800 191,575 1,990,141
Panel C: Cancellation ratio
HFT 0.4862 0.0706 0.5130 0.1237 0.5678 0.2536 0.4904 0.0480
Non-HFT 0.4858 0.0434 0.5133 0.1210 0.5223 0.1491 0.4905 0.0337
HFT e non-HFT 0.0004 * 0.0003 *** 0.0455 *** 0.0001
Panel D: Execution ratio
HFT 0.0529 0.2168 0.0367 0.1179
Non-HFT 0.0733 0.1714 0.0357 0.1493
HFT e non-HFT 0.0203 *** 0.0010 ***
This table reports the limit order volume cancelled and submitted by HFT and non-HFT firms on the LOB of the Nasdaq. Order data of 116 stocks listed on the
Nasdaq and NYSE are examined over the first quarter of 2011. Twenty-six firms are identified as HFT firms and the rest of traders are classified as non-HFT firms.
Each trading day is divided into 5-min intervals. Panel A reports the average limit order volume added, while Panel B reports the average limit order volume
cancelled. Panel C reports the limit order cancellation ratio, which is calculated as the average ratio of limit orders cancelled divided by the sum of limit order
added and cancelled during a time interval. Panel D reports the execution ratio, which is calculated as the total trading volume divided by the total limit order
volume added. Statistics are reported for limit orders submitted to and cancelled from the top 3, 4e10, 11e20, and all top 50 price levels of the LOB. Orders
hidden inside the best quotes are included in the top three price levels. t-tests are performed to compare the corresponding values between HFT and non-HFT for
each category. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively.
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by the arrival rate of market orders. To investigate this
assumption we calculate and plot the intraday volatilities using
trade returns. Fig. 1 shows that across all stock groups, volatility0.0000
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Fig. 1. Intraday liquidity cancellation ratio. This figure shows the proportion of lim
Nasdaq for a sample of 116 stocks listed on the Nasdaq and NYSE over the first qu
January 3, 2011, and divided into large (top 40 stocks), medium (medium 40 stock
firms are identified as HFT firms and the rest are classified as non-HFT firms. Limi
trading day. Cancellation ratio is calculated as the total volume cancelled divided
interval. Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of trade returns for eachis elevated at the beginning of trading day, which decreases
significantly in the next 15 min and then gradually decreases for
the rest of the trading day. However, the cancellation ratio and
intraday volatility do not share similar patterns.0.0000
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it orders cancelled by HFT and non-HFT firms on the limit order book of the
arter of 2011. The sample stocks are sorted by their market capitalizations on
s), and small (final 36 stocks) size groups. Over the sample period, 26 trading
t orders submitted and cancelled are aggregated for each 15-min interval of the
by the sum of total volume cancelled and total volume submitted for each
interval.
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Table 2 reports the sizes of limit orders submitted and
cancelled by HFT and non-HFT firms. As the table shows, the
average sizes of limit orders submitted and cancelled are very
small. The median size of a limit order submitted or cancelled is
about 100e130 shares, depending on the market capitalization
of the stock. In the majority cases, the cut-off level for the
smallest 25% of orders (Q1) is below or equal to 100 shares.
O'Hara, Yao, and Ye (2014) find that on average 19% of trans-
actions executed on Nasdaq are odd lots. They attribute this
observation to the slicing and dicing strategies of HFT firms
when they take liquidity.We provide another explanation, which
is that the odd lot trades can be the result of odd lot limit orders
resting on the LOB from both HFT firms and non-HFT firms.
We next examine whether there are differences between the
sizes of HFT and non-HFT limit orders. Depending on the
market capitalization of the stock, the mean (median) size of
limit orders submitted by HFT firms ranges between 118
shares (100 shares) and 196 shares (130 shares), while for non-
HFT limit orders, the mean (median) size is between 230
shares (103 shares) and 388 shares (136 shares), respectively.
Tests reported in Table 2 show that the size of limit orders
submitted by HFT firms is significantly smaller than that of
non-HFT firms for large- and medium-cap stocks. For small-Table 2
Comparison of limit order size between HFT and non-HFT firms.
Tick HFT Non-HFT
Mean Median Q1 Q3 Mean
Panel A: Large-cap stocks
Limit orders submitted
Top 3 189.44 130.13 100.22 201.98 397.68
4  Level  10 235.42 147.38 105.58 291.03 350.40
All top 50 196.36 130.03 100.64 203.25 387.80
Limit orders cancelled
Top 3 187.04 129.88 100.31 196.10 388.29
4  Level  10 224.94 140.03 104.60 270.87 331.49
All top 50 193.16 129.14 100.81 197.63 371.03
Panel B: Medium-cap stocks
Limit orders submitted
Top 3 109.35 99.95 97.07 107.58 233.51
4  Level  10 140.62 116.65 106.60 151.67 207.37
All top 50 118.48 100.81 98.49 112.29 242.74
Limit orders cancelled
Top 3 110.84 100.08 97.22 108.75 226.42
4  Level  10 131.74 110.76 102.71 141.18 193.23
All top 50 118.46 101.04 98.52 113.19 230.93
Panel C: Small-cap stocks
Limit orders submitted
Top 3 130.10 114.32 95.29 143.09 209.52
4  Level  10 178.28 144.86 121.62 195.61 218.02
All top 50 148.12 120.06 99.44 161.22 230.55
Limit orders cancelled
Top 3 131.87 116.29 97.68 146.09 201.69
4  Level  10 150.45 127.66 107.48 172.56 204.92
All top 50 levels 146.46 121.25 101.07 162.52 219.09
This table reports the average size of limit orders submitted and cancelled by HFT
Nasdaq and NYSE are examined over the first quarter of 2011. Twenty-six firms are
stock, the average size of limit orders and the averages of size distribution quartile
firm are based on a two-tailed t-test (Wilcoxon signed rank test). *, **, and *** incap stocks, the average size of limit orders is smaller for
HFT firms but the median size is larger. This result indicates
that for small-cap stocks there is a significant skewness in the
underlying distributions of HFT and non-HFT limit order
sizes. It is apparent that across all stock groups, the differences
in median sizes between HFT and non-HFT limit orders are
economically small.
In Table 2, for all stock groups, the size of limit orders
submitted by HFT firms to the top three price levels of the
LOB is smaller than those submitted to the rest of price levels,
while the opposite holds for non-HFT firms except for the
small-cap stock group. Orders placed closer to the top of the
LOB bear higher adverse selection risk, while those placed
further away can benefit from transitory price volatilities (Ahn,
Bae, & Chan, 2001). Therefore, our results indicate that
compared with non-HFT firms, HFT firms are more strategic
in placing their limit orders. Table 2 also shows that the limit
order size is the largest for large-cap stocks for both groups.
The results for limit orders cancelled are very similar to those
for limit orders submitted.
2.1.3. Survival time
Table 3 reports the volume-weighted average and distri-
bution quartiles of the survival time of limit orders placed atDifference
Median Q1 Q3 Mean Median
138.24 96.37 311.60 208.24 *** 8.12 ***
137.91 95.21 378.02 114.98 *** 9.47 ***
136.70 96.98 347.23 191.44 *** 6.66 ***
136.83 98.44 296.82 201.25 *** 6.95 ***
134.57 96.31 348.86 106.55 *** 5.46 ***
134.83 97.41 324.85 177.88 *** 5.68 ***
102.11 99.43 165.39 124.16 *** 2.16 ***
105.70 99.64 186.43 66.75 *** 10.95 ***
103.87 99.73 210.56 124.26 *** 3.06 ***
102.03 99.61 158.89 115.58 *** 1.95 ***
104.82 99.36 171.56 61.49 *** 5.94 ***
103.58 99.72 200.68 112.46 *** 2.54 ***
104.60 100.07 184.74 79.42 *** 9.71 ***
129.59 103.24 230.64 39.74 *** 15.27 ***
112.24 100.06 233.94 82.43 *** 7.82 ***
104.32 99.94 176.32 69.83 *** 11.97 ***
122.16 101.94 216.19 54.47 *** 5.50 ***
111.22 100.04 223.98 72.63 *** 10.03 ***
and non-HFT firms on the Nasdaq LOB. Order data of 116 stocks listed on the
identified as HFT firms, and the rest are classified as non-HFT firms. For each
s are reported. The difference in means (medians) between HFT and non-HFT
dicate statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively.
Table 3
Comparison of limit order survival time between HFT and non-HFT firms.
Tick HFT Non-HFT Difference
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Panel A: Large-cap stocks
Total survival time
Top 3 28.74 1.53 37.88 3.02 9.14 *** 1.49 ***
4  Level  10 96.12 12.48 89.71 14.59 6.40 * 2.11 ***
11  Level  20 684.47 222.96 291.53 48.94 392.94 *** 174.02 ***
21  Level  50 956.34 390.56 718.08 153.77 238.26 *** 236.79 ***
All levels 39.30 1.85 51.10 4.12 11.81 *** 2.26 ***
Terminated by cancellation e Top 3 28.25 0.53 32.69 3.02 4.44 *** 2.49 ***
Terminated by execution 72.05 3.37 92.53 6.17 20.48 *** 2.80 ***
Panel B: Medium-cap stocks
Total survival time
Top 3 33.74 5.20 44.83 5.70 11.10 *** 0.50 ***
4  Level  10 86.14 16.91 118.34 26.20 32.20 *** 9.29 ***
11  Level  20 466.51 154.58 195.35 53.44 271.15 *** 101.14 ***
21  Level  50 292.81 93.19 353.69 88.83 60.88 *** 4.35 ***
All levels 40.62 6.02 70.45 8.98 29.83 *** 2.96 ***
Terminated by cancellation e Top 3 30.32 2.15 34.33 3.47 4.01 *** 1.32 ***
Terminated by execution 67.30 9.59 97.67 12.50 30.37 *** 2.91 ***
Panel C: Small-cap stocks
Total survival time
Top 3 51.89 18.04 81.81 17.82 29.93 *** 0.22 ***
4  Level  10 90.06 20.65 202.97 48.01 112.92 *** 27.36 ***
11  Level  20 181.43 91.24 278.66 64.38 97.22 *** 26.86 ***
21  Level  50 174.60 125.05 583.13 152.77 408.53 *** 27.72 ***
All levels 55.71 18.30 124.24 22.43 68.53 *** 4.12 ***
Terminated by cancellation e Top 3 46.16 6.84 40.90 4.48 5.26 *** 2.36
Terminated by execution 101.94 38.28 201.98 41.14 100.04 *** 2.87 ***
This table reports the average survival time of limit orders submitted by HFT and non-HFT firms on the Nasdaq markets. Order data of 116 stocks listed on the
Nasdaq and NYSE are examined over the first quarter of 2011. Twenty-six trading firms are identified as HFT firms over the sample period, and the rest are
classified as non-HFT firms. The survival time of a limit order is calculated as the difference between the time when the order arrives at the LOB and the time the
order is terminated. For each stock the volume-weighted average and the median of the survival time are calculated for each trading day, and then averaged. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively.
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AeC report the statistics for large-, medium-, and small-cap
stock groups, respectively. The survival time of a limit order
is calculated as the difference between the time when the order
arrives at the LOB and the time the order is terminated either
by cancellation or by execution.
The most apparent result in Table 3 is that the survival time
of limit orders at the top of the LOB is very short. For large-
and medium-cap stocks, the median survival time of an HFT
(non-HFT) limit order placed at the top three price levels is
1.53 (3.02) and 5.20 (5.70) seconds, respectively; for small-
cap stocks, most limit orders sit at the top three levels for
less than 20 s.
For large-cap stocks, the average time for an HFT limit order
before being cancelled or executed is 28.74 s, if the order is
placed at the top three price levels of the LOB. The survival time
increases significantly to 96.12 s for an HFT order located be-
tween the price levels of 4 and 10, and to over 600 (900) seconds
if it is located between levels 11 and 20 (21 and 50), respec-
tively. The sharp increase in survival time for orders placed
further from the bid-ask spread holds for both HFT and non-
HFT orders across all stock groups. The shorter survival time
of limit orders closer to the top of the LOB is consistent with the
higher adverse selection risk at these price levels.Table 3 shows that the average (median) time to cancella-
tion for an HFT limit order placed at the top three price levels
of the LOB is 28.25 s (0.53 s), 30.32 s (2.15 s), and 46.16 s
(6.84 s) for large-, medium-, and small-cap stocks, respec-
tively. Results of time to cancellation for non-HFT limit orders
also show that limit orders placed close to the top of LOB are
short-lived, and are cancelled more quickly for larger stocks.
More importantly, for large- and medium-cap stocks, the time
to cancellation at the top three price levels of the LOB is
significantly shorter for HFT limit orders than non-HFT limit
orders. For small-cap stocks, the average time to cancellation
is longer for HFT limit orders, while the median time to
cancellation is indifferent between HFT and non-HFT limit
orders. These results indicate that both groups actively
monitor and manage their limit orders placed at the top of the
LOB, and HFT limit orders are cancelled more quickly than
non-HFT limit orders for the large-and medium-cap stocks.
Table 3 also reports the average and median time to execution
for HFT and non-HFT limit orders. Across all stock groups the
time to execution is significantly shorter for HFT limit orders,
which indicates that HFTs are more capable of predicting
incoming market orders. In general, the results in Table 3
confirm the general perception that the liquidity provided by
HFT firms stays on the LOB for a shorter period of time.
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Table 4 reports the results of an examination of how HFT
liquidity is distributed across the LOB.We take a snapshot of the
LOB at the end of each 5-s interval of a trading day, and calculate
the percentage of limit order volume submitted by HFT firms for
each of the top 50 buy and sell price levels of the LOB. Panels
AeC report the results for large-, medium-, and small-cap stock
groups, respectively. To control for the ex ante market risk faced
by liquidity providers, for each stock and each 5-s time interval,
we calculate the absolute values of the bid-ask midpoint log
returns.We classify a time interval as a high, medium or low risk
interval if the absolute return of the interval falls into the top 1%,
between 90%and 99%, and below 90% levels of the distribution,
respectively. The average percentage of HFT limit order volume
is then calculated for each class of time intervals.
The results in Table 4 show that on average the 26 HFT firms
in our sample contribute about 42%, 33%, and 23% of the total
liquidity at the best bid and offer for large-, medium-, and small-
cap stocks, respectively. The percentage of HFT liquidity de-
creases at an increasing speed as price moves away from the
BBO. These results are consistent with those reported in Table 1.
The liquidity provided by HFT firms is more concentrated in
stocks of larger market capitalization, which is consistent with
Menkveld (2013), who reports that the high-frequency market
maker examined in his study participates in more trades in large
stocks. For large- and medium-cap stocks, the percentage of
liquidity provided byHFT firms is positively related to price risk.
Specifically, relative to non-HFT firms, HFT firms provide more
liquidity during high risk periods. We also calculate the cumu-
lative proportion of HFT volume (not reported). We find that as
the risk level increases from low to medium or from medium to
high, the percentage of HFT liquidity at the top three price levels
of the LOB increases by about 16% for large-cap stocks and 9%
for medium-cap stocks, respectively. The results that HFT firms
increase their liquidity provision during market volatility are
consistentwith the conjecture that they are better atmanaging risk
and are more capable of providing liquidity when it is needed.
This finding is consistent with Carrion (2013), who shows that
HFT firms provide more liquidity in transactions when bid-ask
spreads are wider. For small-cap stocks, the percentage of HFT
volume is more evenly distributed across different risk levels,
which confirms that voluntary market makers are more chal-
lenged in providing liquidity for small stocks (Bessembinder,
Hao, & Zheng, 2012; Grossman &Miller, 1988).192.2. Are HFT limit orders informed?
2.2.1. The LOB slope
If HFT and non-HFT firms are different in their information
endowments, it should be reflected in how they place limit19 Another interesting result of Table 4 is that, for medium- and small-cap
stocks and for large cap stocks during high risk periods, the percentage of
HFT liquidity is not the highest at the BBO price levels but rather at 1 tick
from the BBO. This may indicate that HFT firms strategically place limit
orders to avoid adverse selection risk and benefit from transitory volatilities
when markets are more volatile.orders. Næs and Skjeltorp (2006) find that the slope of the LOB
is strongly related to future return volatility. In this section, we
examine the LOB slopes based on HFT and non-HFT limit or-
ders to determine the relation between future price volatility and
how the firms place their liquidity on the LOB.
First, we visually compare the shapes of the LOBs con-
structed separately from HFT and non-HFT limit orders. More
specifically, a snapshot of the LOB is taken at 9:30:30,
10:00:00, 12:00:00, 15:00:00, and 15:59:30, and the limit or-
ders placed by HFT s and non-HFT firms are identified for
each of the top 50 price levels. The HFT (non-HFT) LOB
shape shown in Fig. 2 is the average cumulative volume of
HFT (non-HFT) limit orders divided by the average cumula-
tive total depth at each price level of the LOB.
The HFT LOB shape in Fig. 2 exhibits a clear intraday
pattern for all stock groups; it is relatively flat around the BBO
at the start of the trading day, and becomes steeper as it moves
towards the close. The change in shape is generally monotonic
in time and coincides with the intraday volatility pattern shown
in Fig. 1. On the other hand, the intraday pattern of the non-HFT
LOB shape is unclear for all stock groups. Placing limit orders
further from the top of the LOB during high market volatility is
consistent with strategic trading behaviour. Indeed, Ahn, Bae,
and Chan (2001) find that traders benefit from trading with
limit orders if the transitory volatility is high. In addition, the
inventory risk of liquidity providers also prevents them from
taking aggressive positions during high volatility periods. Thus,
Fig. 2 indicates that compared with non-HFT firms, HFT firms
are more strategic in placing limit orders.
Next, we formally test the relative informativeness of HFT
and non-HFT firms when they place limit orders on the LOB,
following the methodology proposed by Næs and Skjeltorp
(2006). More specifically, the LOB slope is calculated as:
Slopet ¼ 1
N
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where pn and vn are the price and volume at the n-th price level
of the LOB, respectively,20 and p0 is the bid-ask midpoint. Since
the sensitivity to market risk may be different for limit orders
placed at different price levels, we calculate the order book
slopes based on HFTand non-HFT limit orders placed at the top
3, 4e10, 11e20, and 21e50 price levels of the LOB separately.
Each trading day is divided into 5-s intervals, and the HFT and
non-HFT LOB slopes are calculated at the end of each interval.
To examine the information content in the HFTand non-HFT
LOB slopes, we follow Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994) and Næs
andSkjeltorp(2006)andestimatethefollowingregressions:
Rt ¼
X12
n¼1
Rtnþ
X26
m¼2
Dmþ εt: ð3Þ20 The limit order volume is standardized by the total shares on issue of the
current stock.
Table 4
Distribution of limit orders placed by HFT firms on the LOBs.
Buy Sell
Tick High risk Medium risk Low risk All Tick High risk Medium risk Low risk All
Panel A: Large-cap stocks
0 44.80% 43.87% 37.38% 42.25% 0 45.76% 44.35% 37.60% 42.82%
1 46.42% 41.17% 37.78% 41.99% 1 46.90% 41.26% 37.92% 42.23%
2 40.67% 32.87% 28.49% 34.29% 2 40.88% 32.90% 28.44% 34.36%
3 37.71% 29.57% 24.47% 30.89% 3 37.92% 29.84% 24.77% 31.15%
4 36.02% 28.16% 23.20% 29.43% 4 36.16% 28.76% 23.66% 29.82%
5 35.53% 28.75% 23.70% 29.61% 5 35.78% 29.42% 24.31% 30.12%
10 30.26% 28.23% 24.02% 27.68% 10 29.96% 28.49% 24.70% 27.87%
20 16.97% 18.52% 16.90% 17.49% 20 16.31% 18.09% 16.58% 17.01%
50 2.74% 1.49% 1.35% 1.87% 50 2.84% 1.51% 1.37% 1.92%
Panel B: Medium-cap stocks
0 36.62% 34.78% 27.53% 33.31% 0 37.72% 35.01% 28.12% 33.96%
1 41.22% 39.57% 38.22% 39.76% 1 41.96% 39.60% 38.23% 40.04%
2 35.53% 33.24% 31.43% 33.52% 2 36.20% 33.13% 31.05% 33.61%
3 31.21% 27.87% 27.93% 29.07% 3 31.45% 27.84% 27.18% 28.92%
4 24.96% 22.12% 23.68% 23.57% 4 24.96% 21.97% 23.32% 23.42%
5 20.47% 17.37% 17.96% 18.64% 5 20.63% 17.47% 18.24% 18.81%
10 11.92% 12.61% 7.14% 10.77% 10 11.91% 13.03% 7.44% 11.00%
20 9.04% 10.22% 4.32% 8.07% 20 9.56% 10.53% 4.31% 8.36%
50 0.82% 0.56% 0.65% 0.67% 50 0.79% 0.57% 0.60% 0.65%
Panel C: Small-cap stocks
0 25.69% 23.47% 20.29% 23.34% 0 26.25% 24.02% 20.56% 23.82%
1 30.07% 29.97% 29.16% 29.77% 1 29.73% 29.76% 29.29% 29.62%
2 28.99% 29.98% 28.23% 29.12% 2 29.29% 29.96% 27.96% 29.15%
3 27.80% 29.23% 28.67% 28.57% 3 28.18% 29.69% 29.02% 28.97%
4 23.22% 24.44% 28.01% 25.05% 4 24.10% 25.34% 28.77% 25.90%
5 17.37% 17.84% 21.32% 18.68% 5 17.54% 17.88% 21.34% 18.76%
10 6.83% 6.49% 6.75% 6.69% 10 7.05% 6.72% 7.03% 6.92%
20 3.10% 3.11% 3.27% 3.16% 20 3.20% 3.64% 3.58% 3.47%
50 0.71% 1.07% 1.37% 1.05% 50 0.91% 0.99% 1.33% 1.07%
This table reports the percentage of limit orders placed by HFT firms on the LOB. Order data of 116 stocks listed on the Nasdaq and NYSE are examined for the
first quarter of 2011. Twenty-six HFT firms are identified. A snapshot of the LOB is taken at the end of every 5-s interval between 9:30:30 and 16:00. At each price
level of the LOB, the percentage of HFT volume is calculated as the total volume of limit orders submitted by HFT firms divided by the total volume of all limit
orders at this price level. Tickmeasures the number of ticks between the current bid (ask) price and the best bid (ask) price. Orders hidden inside the best quotes are
included in the Tick 0 category. The results for the top 50 price levels are reported. For each 5-s time interval, the absolute values of the bid-ask midpoint log
returns are calculated and sorted for each stock. A time interval is classified as high, medium or low risk if the absolute return of the interval falls into the top 1%,
between 90%e99%, and below 90% levels of the distribution, respectively.
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Rt is the bid-ask midpoint return for interval t and Dj are stock
dummy variables. Each trading day is further divided into 26
15-min intervals, and Dm are dummy variables for these time
intervals. TurnoverT, MktCapT, and PT are the share turnover,
market capitalization, and average trade price for the current
stock on day T, and Sizet and Tradest are the average trade size
and the number of trades at interval t, respectively. Deptht is
the total limit order volume available at the corresponding
price levels. Under this model specification, the intraday
volatility is estimated in Eq. (3) for each stock as the absolute
value of the return residuals after controlling for the persis-
tence in returns. In Eq. (4), the relation between the LOB slope
and future price volatility is estimated after controlling for
variables known to have an impact on volatility. The results
are reported in Table 5.Table 5 shows that the LOB slope constructed by using HFT
limit orders is consistent with future price volatility. The co-
efficients of HFT LOB slope are negative and significant (except
for the slope at the 21e50 price levels in large- and small-cap
stocks), suggesting that HFT firms remove limit orders located
closer to the front of the LOB and place more at the back of the
LOB ahead of an immediate increase in price volatility. For non-
HFT LOB slope, the coefficient is positive for the top three price
levels for large-cap stocks, which suggests that non-HFT firms
place more limit orders closer to the top of the LOB before an
increase in volatility. Although the rest of the coefficients of non-
HFT slope are mostly negative and significant, statistical tests
reported in Table 5 show that the sensitivity of the HFT LOB
slope to future price volatility is significantly higher than that of
non-HFT LOB slope for all categories in the top 20 price levels.
Brogaard et al. (2014) show that HFT firms are more
informed when initiating trades. Our results complement their
findings and indicate that the informational advantage of HFT
firms extends to their limit order placement. In particular, our
results in Table 5 show that HFT firms can predict short-term
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Fig. 2. The shape of limit order book: intraday analysis. This figure shows the intraday shape of the LOB on the Nasdaq markets for a sample of 116 stocks listed on
the Nasdaq and NYSE over the first quarter of 2011. The sample stocks are sorted by their market capitalization on January 3, 2011, and divided into large (top 40
stocks), medium (medium 40 stocks), and small (final 36 stocks) size groups. Over the sample period, 26 trading firms are identified as HFT firms and the rest are
classified as non-HFT firms. For each stock, at the end of each 5-s interval, the aggregated depth at each of the top 50 price levels of the LOB is calculated. The
average depth contributed by HFT and non-HFT firms at each price level of the LOB is also calculated, and the depicted HFT (non-HFT) LOB shape is the
cumulative percentage of limit order volume placed by HFTs (non-HFTs). A zero depth is imposed when there is no order at a particular price level. This figure
reports the average HFT and non-HFT LOB shape at 9:30:30, 10:00:00, 12:00:00, 15:00:00, and 15:59:30.
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sure on the LOB ahead of the risk than non-HFT firms.21
Table 5 also shows that the greater the depth on the LOB, the
lower the future price volatility, and this relation is more sensi-
tive for orders at the top three price levels. The negative relation
between LOB depth and price volatility supports the prediction
by Foucault, R€oell and Sandås (2003) in that informed liquidity
providers bid less aggressively if they believe that future21 An alternative explanation for our findings is that HFTs strategically place
their limit orders on the LOB, which triggers future price volatility. However,
this cannot explain the results presented in the next section, where we find an
asymmetric impact on returns between limit orders added and cancelled by
HFT and non-HFTs firms.volatility will be high. We also find that volatility is positively
related to trading turnover and market capitalization. For large-
and medium-cap stocks, volatility is positively related to trade
size and the number of trades, and negatively related to average
price, while the opposite holds for small-cap stocks.
2.2.2. Limit order placement activities and future returns
Brogaard et al. (2014) suggest that HFT firms initiate
transactions in the direction of future price movements. If the
technological advantages enable HFT firms to do so when they
take liquidity, it is possible that their liquidity provision ac-
tivities are also informed. We test this hypothesis by esti-
mating the following regression:
Table 5
Limit order book slope and price volatility.
Variables (lagged) Large cap Medium cap Small cap
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Intercept 2.9384 0.0274 *** 0.9707 0.8444 7.5591 0.3890 ***
Turnover 0.0292 0.0016 *** 0.0019 0.0047 0.0142 0.0009 ***
Market cap 0.0021 0.0014 0.1229 0.0000 *** 0.8983 0.0283 ***
Inverse price 15.4000 0.1302 *** 4.7932 0.6329 *** 0.0207 0.0044 ***
Trade size 0.0018 0.0000 *** 0.0084 0.0010 *** 0.2257 0.0193 ***
Number of trades 0.0785 0.0008 *** 0.3671 0.0114 *** 1.5057 0.1997 ***
Total depth
Top 3 22.3800 0.1168 *** 14.8200 0.2029 *** 12.6900 0.4872 ***
4  Level  10 9.5500 0.1476 *** 3.0100 0.2564 *** 5.3600 0.6661 ***
11  Level  20 3.0200 0.1087 *** 3.4200 0.2589 *** 12.3300 0.7108 ***
21  Level 50 0.2700 0.0676 *** 1.0200 0.0952 *** 1.1000 0.2030 ***
LOB slope
HFT
Top 3 2.4358 0.1974 *** 18.5000 0.8200 *** 31.7000 4.2347 ***
4  Level  10 37.0000 0.8978 *** 25.4000 1.7601 *** 117.1000 14.0000 ***
11  Level  20 17.1000 1.5462 *** 41.5000 5.5773 *** 99.7000 44.9000 *
21  Level  50 0.2305 0.7645 7.3294 3.4126 * 27.9000 16.6000
Non-HFT
Top 3 0.2261 0.0099 *** 0.9342 0.0469 *** 1.5344 0.1174 ***
4  Level  10 0.8896 0.0415 *** 1.9413 0.1035 *** 5.0561 0.4228 ***
11  Level  20 1.0257 0.0874 *** 0.3072 0.1883 0.2066 0.5364
21  Level  50 0.2482 0.0431 *** 0.0253 0.0241 0.0277 0.1137
H0: HFT ¼ Non-HFT
Top 3 178.53 *** 472.57 *** 50.04 ***
4  Level  10 1603.57 *** 179.69 *** 63.73 ***
11  Level  20 107.53 *** 54.58 *** 4.91 *
21  Level  50 0.00 4.58 * 2.83
This table reports estimates of Eq. (4):
Rt ¼
P12
n¼1Rtn þ
P26
m¼2Dm þ εt:
jεtj ¼
P12
n¼1jεtnj þ
P26
m¼2Dm þ
P116
j¼2Dj þ TurnoverT þMktCapT þ 1PT þ Sizet þ Tradest þ SlopeHFTt1 þ SlopeNonHFTt1 þ Deptht1 þ ht:
Order data on the Nasdaq markets of 116 stocks listed on the Nasdaq and NYSE are examined over the first quarter of 2011. Twenty-six HFT firms are identified
and the rest are non-HFT traders firms. Each trading day is divided into 5-s time intervals from 9:30:30 to 16:00:00. Rt is the bid-ask midpoint return for interval t.
Dj are stock dummy variables. Each trading day is further divided into 26 15-min intervals with the first interval ending at 9:45:00, and Dm are dummy variables for
these intervals. TurnoverT, MktCapT, and PT are the share turnover, market capitalization, and average trade price for the current stock on day T. Sizet and Tradest
are the average trade size and the number of trades at interval t, respectively. Deptht is the total limit order volume available at particular price levels. Slopet is the
slope of the LOB at the end of interval t and is calculated as:
Slopet ¼ 1N
 
v1p1p01

þPNn¼1 vnþ1vnpnþ1pn 1

!
;
where pn and vn are the price and volume at the nth price level, respectively. Slope
HFT
t and Slope
NonHFT
t are the slope variables constructed using HFT and non-
HFT limit orders only. The limit order volume is normalized by the total shares outstanding of the current stock. p0 is the bid-ask midpoint. Orders on the top 50
price levels of the LOB are examined. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity following White (1980). Except for the return, slope, and dummy
variables, all variables are log transformed. The coefficients and standard errors are enlarged by 106 for the depth variable, and enlarged by 104 for all the other
variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively.
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Rtiþ
X26
m¼2
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X40
j¼2
DjþTurnoverTþMktCapTþ 1
PT
þSizeBuyt þSizeSellt þTradesBuyt þTradesSellt þOrderaddedHFTbuy
t1
þOrder
added
HFTsell
t1
þOrder
added
NonHFTbuy
t1
þOrder
added
NonHFTsell
t1
þOrder
cancelled
HFTbuy
t1
þOrder
cancelled
HFTsell
t1
þOrder
cancelled
NonHFTbuy
t1
þOrder
cancelled
NonHFTsell
t1
þεt:
ð5ÞEach trading day is divided into 5-s intervals. SizeBuyt ðSizeSellt Þ
and TradesBuyt ðTradesSellt Þ are the average size of buyer-
(seller-) initiated trades and the number of buyer- (seller-)
initiated trades during interval t, respectively. Order
added
HFTbuy
t
ðOrder
added
HFTsell
t
Þ and Order
added
NonHFTbuy
t
ðOrder
added
NonHFTsell
t
Þ
are the total buy (sell) limit order volume submitted by HFT
and non-HFT firms during interval t, respectively. Similarly,
Order
cancelled
HFTbuy
t
ðOrder
cancelled
HFTsell
t
Þ and Order
cancelled
NonHFTbuy
t
ðOrder
cancelled
NonHFTsell
t
Þ are the total buy (sell) limit order
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respectively. The rest of variables are as defined in Eq. (4).
Table 4 shows that the proportion of HFT liquidity drops
quickly beyond the top three price levels of the LOB, therefore
we only include limit orders submitted and cancelled within
the top three price levels when calculating the order addition
and cancellation metrics. Except for the dummy and return
variables, all variables are log transformed. The results are
reported in Table 6.
Table 6 shows that an increase in buy (sell) limit orders
for both groups is associated with an increase (decrease) in
future returns. For example, for large-cap stocks, a 10% in-
crease in the HFT (non-HFT) buy limit order volume in the
previous 5-s interval leads to an increase of 0.00064
(0.00097) bps in the returns of the following 5-s interval,
while a 10% increase in the HFT (non-HFT) sell liquidity in
the previous 5-s interval lowers the returns in the following
5-s interval by 0.00065 (0.00092) bps, respectively. The
impact of limit orders on returns is greater for non-HFT
firms, which is not surprising given that their average limit
order volume is almost double that of HFT firms (Table 1,
Panel A).
More importantly, the limit orders cancelled by HFT firms
are consistent with future price movements, while this relation
is less significant for those cancelled by non-HFT firms. A
10% increase in the buy (sell) limit orders cancelled by HFT
firms is associated with a decrease (increase) of 0.00014
(0.0002), 0.00043 (0.00046), and 0.00014 (0.00015) bps in
future returns for large-, medium-, and small-cap stocks,
respectively. The relation between the order cancellation of
non-HFT firms and future returns is the opposite for large-cap
stocks; for medium- and small-cap stocks, it is significantly
weaker than that of HFT firms. The results for order cancel-
lation are especially interesting since, similar to the limit order
volume submitted, the limit orders cancelled by non-HFT
firms at the top three price levels are also close to double
those of HFT firms (Table 1, Panel B). Since limit orders
submitted or cancelled are associated with future price
movements, this result weakens the assertion that order
cancellation by HFT firms causes future price volatility. It
provides support for the alternative explanation that traders
use order cancellation to actively manage the risk exposure of
their limit orders and HFT firms are more capable of doing so
than non-HFT firms.
The results for the control variables are mostly as expected.
Larger buy (sell) limit orders and more buy (sell) trades are
associated with a contemporaneous increase (decrease) in
returns. We also find that market capitalization and the inverse
of average price are negatively (positively) related to price
returns for large-cap (medium- and small-cap) stocks,
respectively.2.3. The informational content of HFT firms' limit orders22 Here we follow the conventional calculation of adverse selection costs in
trades. If the limit order in a trade is a buy (sell) order, then the trade is seller-
(buyer-) initiated.The results in Section 2.2 consistently support that HFT
firms are more informed when supplying liquidity on the
LOB. Liquidity providers face two types of risk: the adverseselection risk if their liquidity is taken by informed traders
and the opportunity costs if their orders are not executed and
price subsequently moves away. Liquidity providers actively
monitor and manage their exposure on the LOB to balance
between these two types of risk (Liu, 2009). In this section,
we provide further analysis on the relative performance of
HFT and non-HFT firms when they supply liquidity and
assess how they manage these risks.
First, we compare the adverse selection costs of liquidity
provided by HFT and non-HFT firms in transactions.
Following Hendershott et al. (2011), the adverse selection
costs of limit orders executed in transactions are calculated
as:
Adverseselectioncostt ¼ qtðmtþnmtÞ
mt
; ð6Þ
where mt and mtþn are the NBBO midpoint at time t and n
seconds, respectively, after time t, and qt is a buy (sell)
indicator, which equals to 1 (1) if it is a buy (sell) trade.22
For each stock, transactions are sorted by trade size over the
sample period, and those falling into the top 5%, between
50% and 95%, and the bottom 50% of the trade size dis-
tribution are classified as small, medium, and large trades,
respectively. For each stock day and trade size category, we
calculate the volume-weighted average adverse selection
costs of limit orders submitted by HFT firms or non-HFT
firms over a 30-s (short-term) and 180-s (long-term) period.
The results in Table 7 show that the adverse selection costs
for HFT limit orders executed in transactions are significantly
lower than those of non-HFT firms for all trades in large-cap
stocks, as well as for the medium- and small-size trades in
medium-cap stocks. The average adverse selection costs of
HFT liquidity executed in small-cap stocks are also lower than
those of non-HFT firms, but the difference is generally
insignificant. These results show that HFT firms are more
capable of identifying informed liquidity takers, especially for
larger stocks and in smaller trades. This informational
advantage of HFT firms in supplying liquidity is more sig-
nificant over a short-term period than a long-term period, as
the differences in adverse selection costs between groups are
generally greater over the short term.
Table 7 also shows that all limit orders incur adverse se-
lection costs, which indicates that liquidity takers on average
are more informed than liquidity providers. This result is
consistent with Harris and Hasbrouck (1996, p. 215), who
find that “if a trader passively places limit orders, and then
(upon execution) actively attempts to reverse the initial trade,
losses are likely to result,” and Benos and Sagade (2012),
who find that aggressive HFT firms are the most informed
among all types of HFT firms. Menkveld (2013) also shows
that high-frequency market makers lose on their inventory
positions to liquidity takers. We also find that the adverse
Table 6
Relation between future returns and order addition and cancellation.
Large-cap Medium-cap Small-cap
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Intercept 11.1639 1.7075 *** 21.7324 6.7814 ** 224.2806 119.2516
Size e buy 3.9304 0.0481 *** 35.2217 0.1968 *** 81.1214 0.7057 ***
Size e sell 4.0345 0.0491 *** 35.9279 0.1965 *** 78.9022 0.6903 ***
# of trades e buy 121.7346 0.2030 *** 224.7282 1.3488 *** 346.2010 6.2162 ***
# of trades e sell 123.5578 0.2039 *** 224.3631 1.3231 *** 342.2134 5.8669 ***
Turnover 0.0952 0.0802 0.1344 0.1021 0.2770 0.3115
Market capitalization 0.3807 0.0779 *** 0.9691 0.3145 ** 10.2000 5.5544
Inverse price 29.8366 4.9335 *** 2.8269 4.2055 117.0374 79.1118
Liquidity addition
HFT buy 0.6427 0.0226 *** 1.3595 0.0462 *** 3.0955 0.1163 ***
Non-HFT buy 0.9675 0.0184 *** 1.8493 0.0320 *** 3.6457 0.0722 ***
H0: HFT buy ¼ non-HFT buy 114.34 *** 73.48 *** 16.49 ***
HFT sell 0.6516 0.0224 *** 1.3024 0.0460 *** 2.9992 0.1154 ***
Non-HFT sell 0.9211 0.0184 *** 1.7453 0.0313 *** 3.7080 0.0721 ***
H0: HFT sell ¼ non-HFT sell 79.37 *** 61.63 *** 27.27 ***
Liquidity cancellation
HFT buy 0.1483 0.0221 *** 0.4368 0.0461 *** 1.3806 0.1161 ***
Non-HFT buy 0.1141 0.0177 *** 0.2804 0.0313 *** 0.7127 0.0712 ***
H0: HFT buy ¼ non-HFT buy 74.37 *** 7.26 ** 22.69 ***
HFT sell 0.2011 0.0219 *** 0.4604 0.0455 *** 1.4521 0.1145 ***
Non-HFT sell 0.0671 0.0178 *** 0.3710 0.0306 *** 0.9416 0.0712 ***
H0: HFT sell ¼ non-HFT sell 78.20 *** 2.43 13.51 ***
This table reports estimates of the regression model:
Rt ¼
P12
i¼1Rti þ
P26
m¼2Dm þ
P40
j¼2Dj þ TurnoverT þMktCapT þ 1PT þ Size
Buy
t þ SizeSellt þ TradesBuyt þ TradesSellt þ OrderaddedHFTbuy
t1
þ Order
added
HFTsell
t1
þ
Order
added
NonHFTbuy
t1
þ Order
added
NonHFTsell
t1
þ Order
cancelled
HFTbuy
t1
þ Order
cancelled
HFTsell
t1
þ Order
cancelled
NonHFTbuy
t1
þ Order
cancelled
NonHFTsell
t1
þ εt:
Order data on the Nasdaq markets for a total of 116 stocks listed on the Nasdaq and NYSE are examined for the first quarter of 2011. Twenty-six trading firms are
identified as HFT traders over the sample period, and the rest of traders are classified as non-HFT traders. Each trading day is divided into 5-s intervals from
9:30:30 to 16:00:00, and Rt is the bid-ask midpoint return for interval t. Dm are stock dummy variables. Each trading day is further divided into 26 15-min intervals
with the first interval ending at 9:45:00, and Dj are time dummy variables representing these time intervals. TurnoverT, MktCapT and PT are share turnover, market
capitalization, and average trade price for the current stock on day T. SizeBuyt ðSizeSellt Þ, and TradesBuyt ðTradesSellt Þ are the average size of buyer- (seller-) initiated
trades and the number of buyer- (seller-) initiated trades during interval t, respectively. Order
added
HFTbuy
t
ðOrder
added
HFTsell
t
Þ, and Order
added
NonHFTbuy
t
ðOrder
added
NonHFTsell
t
Þ
are the total buy (sell) limit order volume submitted during interval t, respectively. Similarly, Order
cancelled
HFTbuy
t
ðOrder
cancelled
HFTsell
t
Þ, and Order
cancelled
NonHFTbuy
t
ðOrder
cancelled
NonHFTsell
t
Þ are the total buy (sell) limit order volume cancelled during interval t, respectively. Orders submitted to the top three price levels of the LOB
are examined. Except for the dummy and return variables, all variables are log transformed. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity using White (1980).
Rt is enlarged by 10
6 in model estimation to avoid loss of precision in calculation. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels,
respectively.
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monotonically with trade size (stock size). This finding in-
dicates that adverse selection risk is higher for liquidity
providers when they participate in larger transactions and
less liquid stocks.
Our results in Table 7 show that non-HFT firms incur
higher adverse selection costs than HFT firms when
providing liquidity in transactions, especially for large- and
medium-cap stocks. However, the differences in adverse se-
lection costs can be the result of their rational behaviours. In
particular, unlike HFT firms who are professional traders and
hence more sensitive to short-term price movements, non-
HFT firms may include investors with a trading interest
based on their expected long-term stock performance (e.g.,
value investors) or temporary liquidity demand (e.g., a
mutual fund manager receiving client requests). Hence, for
non-HFT firms, the final success of an order being executed
can be more important (Economides & Schwartz, 1995).Hoffman (2014) demonstrates that to compete with those
more informed, traders increase the aggressiveness of their
quotes to maintain a constant execution probability. There-
fore, the higher adverse selection costs incurred by non-HFT
firms documented in Table 7 can be due to their strategic
behaviour of posting limit orders more aggressively in order
to achieve a better execution rate.
To test the hypothesis, for each stock group we calculate
the volume-weighted average opportunity costs of limit orders
submitted and cancelled by HFT and non-HFT firms using the
limit order opportunity costs dataset described in Section 1.
The results in Panel A of Table 8 show that the opportunity
costs of limit orders are all positive, and similar to the adverse
selection costs reported in Table 7. The opportunity costs are
positively related to stock liquidity, and increase with order
size for non-HFT firms. Hendershott et al. (2011) find that
liquidity providers charge an effective spread to cover the
costs associated with market making. Using national
Table 7
Adverse selection costs for liquidity providers in transactions.
Trade size Short-term Long-term
HFT Non-HFT HFT e Non-HFT t-stat HFT Non-HFT HFT e Non-HFT t-stat
Panel A: Large stocks
Small 1.3763 2.0090 0.6327 19.83 *** 1.3511 1.9655 0.6144 13.9 ***
Medium 1.6371 2.1170 0.4799 14.53 *** 1.6802 2.0674 0.3872 9.76 ***
Large 1.9081 2.5328 0.6248 11.40 *** 1.9492 2.5080 0.5588 7.37 ***
Panel B: Medium stocks
Small 2.2419 2.9230 0.6812 8.86 *** 2.4977 2.9634 0.4657 3.84 ***
Medium 2.9193 3.4039 0.4846 7.33 *** 3.2847 3.5110 0.2263 2.32 *
Large 4.1316 4.1770 0.0455 0.22 4.4529 4.3893 0.0636 0.21
Panel C: Small stocks
Small 3.8453 4.0724 0.2270 0.83 4.2858 4.4463 0.1606 0.46
Medium 5.2408 5.6933 0.4524 2.06 * 5.8195 6.0778 0.2583 0.88
Large 6.9985 7.2202 0.2217 0.41 6.7535 8.1269 1.3734 1.97 *
This table reports the adverse selection costs incurred by HFT and non-HFT firms when they provide liquidity in transactions. Transaction data on the Nasdaq
markets for 116 stocks listed on the Nasdaq and NYSE are examined for the first quarter of 2011. Twenty-six HFT firms are identified and the rest are non-HFT
firms. All transactions on the Nasdaq markets are sorted by trade size for each stock over the sample period, and transactions falling into the top 5%, between 50%
and 95% and the bottom 50% of the trade size distribution are classified as small, medium and large trades, respectively. The adverse selection costs of limit orders
executed in transactions are calculated as:
Adverse selection costt ¼ qtðmtþnmtÞmt ; ð6Þ:
where mt and mtþn are the NBBO midpoint at time t and n seconds, respectively, after time t, and qt is a buy (sell) indicator, which equals to 1 (1) if it is a buy
(sell) trade. For each stock day, the volume-weighted average adverse selection costs for liquidity provided by HFTs and non-HFTs in transactions are calculated
over a 30-s (short-term) and 180-s (long-term) period. The adverse selection costs reported are expressed in basis points. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively.
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sample period, Hatheway, Kwan, and Zheng (2013) find that
the realized spreads, which are the differences between the
effective spreads and the adverse selection costs, are close to
zero on exchanges even after liquidity rebates. They conclude
that trading on exchanges is highly toxic for liquidity pro-
viders. Our results indicate that liquidity providers are
informed about short-term price movements and strategically
charge a liquidity premium in addition to the effective spreads
to assert a competitive stance against the informed liquidity
takers.
The results in Table 8 on the partition of HFT firms and
non-HFT firms follow a similar pattern as those reported in
Table 7. For small and medium orders in large-cap stocks and
small orders in medium-cap stocks, limit orders placed by
HFT firms incur significantly higher opportunity costs than
those placed by non-HFT firms over both short- and long-term
periods; in the rest categories, opportunity costs are generally
higher for non-HFT limit orders.
Table 8 also reports the percentages of small, medium, and
large limit orders submitted by HFTs and non-HFT firms. It is
apparent that the majority of limit orders are in the small size
category. Therefore, our results indicate that HFT firms are
more capable of supplying liquidity in larger stocks and
smaller transactions, where they charge a higher liquidity
premium to offset the adverse selection costs.23 These results23 An increase in the opportunity costs can also be driven by limit orders
placed inside the NBBO. To rule out the potential impact from this effect, we
also conduct the tests in Table 8 after excluding limit orders that improve the
NBBO. The results of this robustness are very similar to those reported in
Table 8.also provide supportive evidence of our earlier findings that
HFT firms are more aggressive in providing liquidity in larger
stocks (Table 4).
The results in Panel B of Table 8 show that limit orders
cancelled by HFT firms incur lower opportunity costs than
those cancelled by non-HFT firms and the differences are
statistically significant across all categories. These results
suggest that compared with non-HFT firms, HFTs are more
capable of identifying and cancelling liquidity that later be-
comes cheap, which also suggests that they are more informed
than non-HFT firms.
In Table 8, Panel A, our results for limit orders submitted
in small-cap stocks are inconclusive. An interesting ques-
tion, therefore, is whether there is any difference between
the groups in the opportunity costs they incur for orders
cancelled relative to orders submitted. We first determine
(1) the differences in the opportunity costs of orders sub-
mitted by both groups, as well as (2) the differences in
opportunity costs of orders cancelled by both groups. We
then subtract (2) from (1) for each corresponding order and
trader types.
Panel C of Table 8 shows that the results of the difference-
in-differences tests are positive and significant for all orders
for large-cap stocks and for small and median orders for
medium-cap stocks. The results for small orders in small-cap
stocks are also positive and significant. These results indicate
that relative to non-HFT firms, HFT firms are more capable of
identifying and cancelling liquidity with lower opportunity
costs, and lends further support to our results in Tables 5 and 6
that HFT firms are more capable of using order cancellation to
monitor and manage their limit order risk exposure. Since the
majority of orders submitted and cancelled are in the small
Table 8
Opportunity costs of limit orders submitted and cancelled.
Order size Short-term Long-term % of Orders
HFT Non-HFT HFT e Non-HFT t-stat HFT Non-HFT HFT e Non-HFT t-stat HFT Non-HFT
Panel A: Opportunity costs of limit orders added
Large-cap stocks
Small 1.0480 0.8307 0.2172 12.31 *** 1.0834 0.9013 0.1821 6.37 *** 79 70
Medium 1.3775 1.1239 0.2586 8.18 *** 1.3674 1.2256 0.1453 2.82 ** 21 25
Large 1.5541 1.5112 0.0393 0.76 1.5432 2.3858 0.8298 6.60 *** 1 5
Medium-cap stocks
Small 1.2918 0.9710 0.3190 4.01 *** 1.5782 1.1536 0.4229 2.64 ** 92 73
Medium 1.3183 1.2641 0.0454 0.45 1.2432 1.7457 0.4986 2.36 * 7 21
Large 1.1391 1.7675 0.8427 2.54 * 1.3848 2.9729 1.7247 3.6 *** 1 5
Small-cap stocks
Small 1.9797 1.6802 0.3061 2.44 * 2.3752 2.4257 0.0451 0.13 86 69
Medium 1.7894 2.3532 0.5532 2.64 ** 1.8571 3.3908 1.6569 3.94 *** 13 26
Large 1.5183 2.8530 1.8640 3.95 *** 1.6083 4.1820 3.1005 4.53 *** 4 4
Panel B: Opportunity costs of limit orders cancelled
Large-cap stocks
Small 0.1063 0.2915 0.1852 14.16 *** 0.1135 0.3092 0.1958 7.30 *** 80 69
Medium 0.2053 0.3924 0.1825 7.25 *** 0.2056 0.4187 0.2102 4.25 *** 20 26
Large 0.1262 0.8781 0.7426 12.21 *** 0.1211 1.5786 1.4210 9.41 *** 1 5
Medium-cap stocks
Small 0.0416 0.3709 0.4167 5.00 *** 0.1676 0.5273 0.3640 2.07 * 92 74
Medium 0.0360 0.6359 0.6769 5.91 *** 0.0996 1.0780 1.1734 5.37 *** 7 21
Large 0.1793 1.1849 1.5299 5.04 *** 0.1044 2.2545 2.1676 4.15 *** 1 5
Small-cap stocks
Small 0.1693 0.8666 0.6717 5.20 *** 0.4293 1.4173 0.9815 4.55 *** 85 70
Medium 0.4472 1.5136 1.1572 4.24 *** 0.1966 2.4820 2.4620 5.53 *** 13 26
Large 0.9332 1.7391 1.2331 2.01 * 1.2510 2.9658 2.0379 2.35 * 5 4
Panel C: Difference-in-differences
Large-cap stocks
Small 0.4024 29.50 *** 0.3778 12.32 ***
Medium 0.4411 13.23 *** 0.3554 5.42 ***
Large 0.7927 9.66 *** 0.6254 2.98 **
Medium-cap stocks
Small 0.7170 6.65 *** 0.7710 3.11 **
Medium 0.7335 4.91 *** 0.6724 2.28 *
Large 0.6690 1.84 0.5352 0.67
Small-cap stocks
Small 0.9822 5.69 *** 0.9879 3.33 ***
Medium 0.5489 1.97 * 0.6465 1.62
Large 0.7797 1.19 1.0011 1.20
This table reports the opportunity costs of HFT and non-HFT firms at the time of submitting or cancelling a limit order on the Nasdaq markets. Limit order
opportunity cost is calculated as:
Opportunitycostt ¼ qtðmtþnmtÞmt ; ð1Þ.
where mt and mtþn are the NBBO midpoint at time t and n seconds, respectively, after time t, and pt is the price of the limit order. qt is a buy sell indicator,
which equals to 1 (1) if the order is buyer- (seller-) initiated. Order data on the Nasdaq markets for 116 stocks listed on the Nasdaq and NYSE are examined
for the first quarter of 2011. Twenty-six HFT firms are identified and the rest are non-HFT firm. The sample stocks are sorted by their market capitalization on
January 1, 2011, and divided into large (top 40 stocks), medium (medium 40 stocks), and small (final 36 stocks) size groups. For each stock day, all limit
orders submitted are sorted by order size, and a limit order submitted or cancelled is classified as a small, medium or large order if the order size falls into the
top 5%, between 50% and 95%, and the bottom 50% levels of the size distribution, respectively. For each stock day, the volume-weighted average opportunity
costs are calculated for limit orders submitted (Panel A) and for limit orders cancelled (Panel B) at the top three price levels of the LOB over a 30-s (short-
term) and 180-s (long-term) period. Opportunity costs reported are in basis points. The percentage of limit orders submitted (cancelled) at the top three price
levels of the LOB is also reported. Panel C shows the differences in opportunity costs between HFT and non-HFT firms for orders submitted (Panel A), as well
as the differences in opportunity costs between HFT and non-HFT firms for orders cancelled (Panel B). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 0.05,
0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively.
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that when supplying liquidity, HFT firms utilize their superior
trading technology (i.e., the ability to cancel orders quickly)
and information about short-term price movements to charge a
higher liquidity premium in an attempt to reduce the adverse
selection imposed by better-informed liquidity takers. Thishigher liquidity premium explains the lower adverse selection
costs for HFT limit order in transactions documented in Table
7. Our results also provide supportive evidence consistent
with the projection that non-HFT firms incur higher adverse
selection costs in transactions because they are more aggres-
sive in placing limit orders. As discussed above, such
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expose their limit orders to higher adverse selection risk when
their trading intension is not directly related to short-term
stock performance.
Table 8 demonstrates that limit orders are informed. Ahn,
Bae, and Chan (2001) suggest that limit orders can be
optimal for traders with long-term information. However, the
ex post price movements documented in Table 8 are measured
over a relatively short time period. Why do traders place limit
orders if they possess short-term information? To investigate
this issue we compare the relative spreads immediately before
a limit order is placed with the opportunity costs incurred for
the limit order. For each stock day and order size category, we
calculate the average relative spreads immediately before a
limit order is placed at the NBBO price levels.24 We then
compare the relative spreads with the opportunities costs of the
limit order.
Table 9 shows that for the HFT limit orders, the average
relative spreads range from 3.5 bps (large-cap stocks) to
32 bps (small-cap stocks), while the long- and short-term
opportunity costs are mostly 1e2 bps across all order
sizes and stock groups. The relative spreads for limit orders
are similar for both groups. Consistent with Table 8 results,
the opportunity costs of non-HFT firms are generally
smaller than those of HFT firms for larger stocks and
smaller orders. More importantly, our results confirm that
across all categories, the relative spreads are significantly
larger than the opportunity costs. These results show that a
limit order is submitted when the trader's short-term infor-
mation is not sufficient to cover the transaction costs of a
market order. Our results are consistent with Bloomfield,
O'Hara, and Saar (2005), who show that informed traders
tend to submit limit orders when their information level is
low. Table 9 also shows that the limit order opportunity
costs increase with order size and decrease with stock size,
consistent with Table 8. The relative spreads exhibit a
similar pattern.2.4. The impact of HFT limit orders on market volatilityThe SEC Concept Release 2010 (p. 48) raises a question
on HFT: Is there any evidence that proprietary firms in-
crease or reduce the amount of liquidity they provide to the
market during times of stress? To answer this question, we
use two proxies for market stress: price volatility and
liquidity imbalance shocks. We are interested in how HFT
firms supply liquidity following market volatility, as well as
how they react to shocks in liquidity imbalances on the
LOB.24 We only use limit orders placed at the NBBO when comparing relative
spreads and opportunity costs. First, traders placing limit orders at the NBBO
are most keen to have their orders executed, and hence they are more likely to
consider market orders as an alternative. Traders placing limit orders further
from the NBBO may have other strategic considerations. Second, the exclu-
sion of other limit orders in the calculation also creates a bias against us,
because a trader who is only willing to place limit orders at the back of the
LOB must pay more to turn them into market orders.We first examine the liquidity provision of HFT firms
following market volatility. Table 1 shows that both HFT firms
and non-HFT firms have a high order cancellation ratio. To
measure the liquidity meaningful to liquidity demanders, we
divide each trading day into 30-s intervals, and calculate for
each interval the net HFT (non-HFT) liquidity as the differ-
ence between total limit order volume submitted and
cancelled.
The relation between net liquidity provision and market
volatility is modelled as:
Net_liquidityt¼DHFT þ
X26
m¼2
Dmþ
X40
j¼2
DjþTurnoverT þMktCap
þ 1
PT
þSizetþVolatilityt1þDHFT Volatilityt1
þDxvola DHFT Volatilityt1þ εt:
ð7Þ
Net_liquidityt is the net liquidity provided by HFT firms or
non-HFT firms within five price levels of the LOB during
interval t.25 DHFT is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the
current net liquidity provision is for an HFT firm, or 0 other-
wise. Volatilityt is the standard deviation of second-by-second
bid-ask midpoint returns during interval t. All other control
variables are defined as in Table 5. To further identify periods
of market stress, we sort Volatilityt for each stock over the
sample period, and use dummy variable Dxvola to represent the
largest 1% of volatility.26 To reduce cross-sectional variation,
we standardize all continuous variables by stock.
Table 10 shows that the coefficient of Volatilityt is negative
for large-cap stocks and positive for small-cap stocks, which
indicates that non-HFT firms on average reduce the net
liquidity supply in large-cap stocks and increase liquidity
supply in small-cap stocks following an increase in market
volatility. There is no significant change in the liquidity pro-
vision by non-HFTs in medium-cap stocks. The coefficient of
Dxvola is positive and significant for large- and medium-cap
stocks, which indicates that non-HFT firms provide more
liquidity following an unusually high market volatility in these
stocks. Since liquidity is more expensive during high vola-
tility, liquidity suppliers can earn an additional liquidity
premium.
In Table 10, the coefficient of DHFT is negative and sig-
nificant for large-cap stocks, which suggests that on average
HFT firms provide less net liquidity than non-HFT firms.
This is consistent with Table 1, which shows the total limit
order volume for HFT firms is lower than that for non-HFT
firms. More importantly, the coefficient of DHFT  Volatilityt
is positive and significant for large- and medium-cap stocks.25 Other than the 30-s interval, we also use intervals of 5 s, 60 s, 180 s, 300 s,
and 900 s. Our results are robust to these alternative time intervals.
26 Brogaard et al. (2014) use a 10% cut-off level to identify days of market
stress. Since our sampling time interval is much shorter and may contain
more noise, we adopt a tighter threshold. The 1% threshold is also widely
used in the literature to identify jumps in intraday volatility (e.g., Lee &
Mykland, 2008).
Table 9
Relative spreads and limit order opportunity costs.
Order size Relative spreads Opportunity costs Opportunity costs e relative spreads
Short-term Long-term
Short-term Long-term Mean t-stat Mean t-stat
Section A: HFT limit orders
Panel I: Large-cap stocks
Small 3.6376 1.0480 1.0834 2.5896 64.03 *** 2.554 60.21 ***
Median 3.6701 1.3773 1.3683 2.2928 49.80 *** 2.302 44.96 ***
Large 3.8599 1.5540 1.5431 2.3059 29.17 *** 2.317 18.43 ***
Panel II: Medium-cap stocks
Small 10.0950 1.2916 1.5782 8.8035 66.40 *** 8.517 46.67 ***
Median 10.2744 1.3138 1.2205 8.9607 62.03 *** 9.054 42.19 ***
Large 18.7465 1.1307 1.3768 17.6159 23.13 *** 17.370 20.89 ***
Panel III: Small-cap stocks
Small 30.5576 1.9869 2.3968 28.5707 51.88 *** 28.161 49.81 ***
Median 30.5898 1.8197 1.9706 28.7701 47.53 *** 28.619 43.64 ***
Large 44.9008 1.4574 1.5816 43.4434 34.57 *** 43.319 32.71 ***
Section B: Non-HFT limit orders
Panel I: Large-cap stocks
Small 3.6216 0.8307 0.9013 2.7909 65.68 *** 2.720 58.73 ***
Median 3.6665 1.1239 1.2256 2.5425 56.51 *** 2.441 43.69 ***
Large 3.7799 1.5112 2.3858 2.2688 42.92 *** 1.394 17.44 ***
Panel II: Medium-cap stocks
Small 10.8566 0.9707 1.1510 9.8858 80.80 *** 9.706 70.84 ***
Median 11.0536 1.2634 1.7420 9.7902 68.19 *** 9.312 52.29 ***
Large 11.9996 1.7672 2.9735 10.2324 68.71 *** 9.026 42.78 ***
Panel III: Small-cap stocks
Small 31.3141 1.6804 2.4258 29.6337 76.32 *** 28.888 70.61 ***
Median 32.4906 2.3507 3.3866 30.1400 74.05 *** 29.104 66.67 ***
Large 31.3606 2.8518 4.1828 28.5089 65.95 *** 27.178 58.31 ***
This table reports the relative spreads and the opportunity costs of limit orders placed at the NBBO price levels on the Nasdaq markets. Relative spreads are
calculated based on the NBBO prices immediately before the limit order arrives on the market. The long- and short-term opportunity costs are as defined in Table 8.
Order data on the Nasdaq markets for 116 stocks listed on the Nasdaq and NYSE are examined for the first quarter of 2011. Twenty-six HFT firms are identified
and the rest are non-HFT firms. The sample stocks are sorted by their market capitalization on January 1, 2011, and divided into large (top 40 stocks), medium
(medium 40 stocks), and small (final 36 stocks) size groups. Only orders placed at the NBBO price levels are considered. For each stock day, all limit orders
submitted are sorted by order size, and a limit order submitted or cancelled is classified as a small, medium or large order if the order size falls into the top 5%,
between 50% and 95%, and the bottom 50% levels of the size distribution, respectively. Relative spreads an opportunity costs are in basis points. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively.
Table 10
Net liquidity provision.
Large-cap stocks Medium-cap stocks Small cap-stocks
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Intercept 0.3176 0.0057 *** 0.0840 0.0082 *** 0.0267 0.0137
ISize 0.0165 0.0008 *** 0.0020 0.0021 0.0021 0.0022
I# of trades 0.1450 0.0021 *** 0.0480 0.0029 *** 0.0323 0.0030 ***
ITurnover 0.0751 0.0008 *** 0.0464 0.0013 *** 0.0263 0.0019 ***
IInverse price 0.0284 0.0018 *** 0.0231 0.0071 ** 0.0228 0.0077 **
IVolatility 0.1021 0.0020 *** 0.0025 0.0030 0.0361 0.0035 ***
IDHFT 0.0169 0.0011 *** 0.0022 0.0020 0.0033 0.0034
IDHFT  Volatility 0.1111 0.0023 *** 0.0245 0.0039 *** 0.0047 0.0120
IDx_vola 0.2765 0.0156 *** 0.0738 0.0205 *** 0.0047 0.0298
IDx_vola  DHFT 0.1652 0.0227 *** 0.0248 0.0338 0.0479 0.0759
This table reports the estimates of regression:
Netliquidityt ¼ DHFT þ
P26
m¼2Dm þ
P40
j¼2Dj þ TurnoverT þ 1PT þ Sizet þ Tradest þ Volatilityt1 þ DHFT  Volatilityt1 þ Dxvola þ Dxvola  DHFT þ εt:
Each trading day is divided into 30-s intervals. Netliquidityt is the net liquidity provided by HFT and non-HFT firms during interval t. The net liquidity is calculated as
the difference between total limit order volume submitted and total limit order volume cancelled. Limit orders within five ticks from the Nasdaq BBO prices are
considered. DHFT is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the current net liquidity observation is for a HFT firm, or 0 otherwise. Volatilityt is the standard deviation of
second-by-second bid-ask midpoint returns during interval t. For each stock, Volatilityt is sorted for the sample period and Dxvola equals 1 if the current volatility
falls into the largest 1% of the volatility distribution. All other variables are defined as in Table 5. Except for the dummy variables, all variables are standardized by
stock. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity using White (1980). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels,
respectively.
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HFT firms, a one standard deviation increase in price vola-
tility leads to an additional 0.11 standard deviation increase
in the net liquidity supply by HFT firms in the following
period for large-cap stocks, and 0.02 standard deviation in-
crease for medium-cap stocks. For small-cap stocks, the
coefficient is negative and insignificant, which indicates that
the liquidity supply by HFT firms is indifferent from that of
non-HFTs following market volatility. The coefficient of
Dxvola  DHFT is positive and significant for the large-cap
stocks, suggesting that HFTs provide more liquidity in
these stocks following exceptionally high market volatility.
In particular, a one standard deviation increase in extreme
volatility is followed by an additional 0.06 standard deviation
increase in the net liquidity provision by HFT firms. The
coefficient of Dxvola  DHFT is insignificant for medium- and
small-cap stocks, suggesting that the liquidity supply by both
groups is similar following extreme market volatility. These
results indicate that for liquid stocks, HFT firms can manage
the limit order risk more effectively and increase the net
supply of liquidity following an increase in volatility. This
finding is consistent with the prediction of Jovanovic and
Menkveld (2011) that as the middleman between buyers
and sellers, HFT firms increase their participation when there
is more information on the market. Our results show that for
less liquid stocks, both groups play a similar role in the
supply of liquidity post market volatility.
We next examine how HFT and non-HFT firms react to
liquidity imbalance shocks. Previous research demonstrates
that abnormal order imbalances precede market vitality. For
example, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005) find that
excessive buy or sell limit orders on the LOB can trigger
large short-term price movements. Chordia, Roll, and
Subrahmanyam (2008) demonstrate that this effect is more
profound when market liquidity is low. To examine the
relation between market liquidity imbalance shocks and limit
order placement by HFT and non-HFT firms, we estimate the
following model:
Slopet ¼
X116
j¼2
Dj þ
X10
m¼1
ResiOIti þDHFT þ
X10
n¼1
DHFT
ResiOItn þ ht:
ð8Þ
Consistent with Eq. (7), each trading day is divided into 30-
s intervals. Slopet measures the slope of the LOB at the end
of each interval, and is calculated following Eq. (2). We
calculate the buy and sell LOB slopes separately. Dj are stock
dummy variables. ResiOIt measures shocks in the liquidity
imbalances and is obtained from the residuals of the
regression:
OIt ¼
X10
m¼1
OItiþ ht: ð9Þ
For each time interval, we calculate the net buy (sell) limit
order volume as the difference between the buy (sell) limitorder volume submitted and cancelled. The net order imbal-
ance OIt is the difference between the net buy limit order
volume and the net sell limit order volume. DHFT is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if the Slopet is constructed by using limit
orders from HFT firms, and 0 otherwise. In Eq. (9), the net
order imbalance is modelled as an autoregressive process, and
the order imbalance residuals represent liquidity shocks on the
current market. Therefore, we can use Eq. (8) to examine how
HFT and non-HFT firms adjust their limit order placement in
response to past liquidity shocks. We include orders placed in
the top 10 price levels of the LOB when estimating Eq. (9).
For Eq. (8), all variables are standardized by stock except for
the dummy variable.
A distinct feature of our models is that we measure
liquidity imbalance based on limit order volume instead of
trading volume. Previous research tends to use trading volume
imbalance as the proxy for order imbalance (e.g., Chordia,
Roll, & Subrahmanyam, 2000), which is essentially a proxy
for the imbalance of market orders. O'Hara (2015, p. 19) ar-
gues that “algorithmic trading means that trades are not the
basic unit of market information e the underlying orders are.”
With liquidity imbalance calculated based on the net inflow of
limit orders over a short time frame, we are able to capture the
underlying price pressure, as well as the associated risk faced
by limit order traders. Thus, our model is more predictive of
how liquidity providers will react strategically to the dynamics
on the LOB.
In Table 11, Panel A (Panel B) reports the estimates of Eq.
(8), where the LOB slope variable is constructed by using buy
(sell) limit orders, respectively. As the table shows, DHFT is
positive and significant in both Panels A and B, which is
consistent with Table 4, and indicates that HFT firms tend to
place more orders near the top of the LOB. The results also
show that lagged liquidity shocks have a positive impact on
the buy slope of non-HFT liquidity but have the opposite
effect on its sell slope. Since liquidity imbalance is measured
as the difference between net buy and sell limit order vol-
umes, this result indicates that following a positive shock in
the liquidity imbalance, non-HFT firms update their limit
orders on the LOB in the same direction as the liquidity
shock (i.e., placing more buy orders closer to, and moving
more sell orders away from, the top of the LOB). Although
the effect of the shocks reduces over time, the coefficient of
ResiOIt remains significant after 10 lags. This placement
strategy helps protect liquidity suppliers from being picked
off by liquidity takers. However, such strategies can further
exacerbate the prevailing order imbalance and market
volatility.
The coefficients of lagged DHFT  ResiOIt are negative and
significant in Table 11, Panel A, which indicates that following
a positive (negative) shock in order imbalance, HFT firms
place less (more) buy orders closer to the best bid price
relative to non-HFT firms. The magnitude of the coefficients
also exhibits an interesting pattern. The coefficient of DHFT 
ResiOIt1 is smaller than that of ResiOIt1 , showing that imme-
diately after the liquidity shock, both HFT and non-HFT firms
adjust their limit orders in the same direction of the shock.
Table 11
Order imbalances and limit order book slope.
Large-cap stocks Medium-cap stocks Small-cap stocks
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Panel A: LOB buy slope
Intercept 0.0033 0.0020 0.0627 0.0041 *** 0.6884 0.0234 ***
DHFT 0.0134 0.0006 *** 0.0543 0.0017 *** 0.3080 0.0096 ***
Resi_OI_lag1 0.0424 0.0036 *** 0.0405 0.0041 *** 0.0953 0.0343 **
Resi_OI_lag2 0.0327 0.0018 *** 0.0341 0.0039 *** 0.1066 0.0345 **
Resi_OI_lag3 0.0298 0.0018 *** 0.0309 0.0041 *** 0.0549 0.0140 ***
Resi_OI_lag4 0.0261 0.0018 *** 0.0284 0.0051 *** 0.0448 0.0136 ***
Resi_OI_lag5 0.0246 0.0017 *** 0.0242 0.0038 *** 0.0462 0.0133 ***
Resi_OI_lag6 0.0200 0.0017 *** 0.0249 0.0037 *** 0.0618 0.0143 ***
Resi_OI_lag7 0.0169 0.0015 *** 0.0244 0.0043 *** 0.0404 0.0106 ***
Resi_OI_lag8 0.0167 0.0016 *** 0.0224 0.0041 *** 0.0480 0.0123 ***
Resi_OI_lag9 0.0142 0.0014 *** 0.0155 0.0031 *** 0.0510 0.0216 *
Resi_OI_lag10 0.0144 0.0015 *** 0.0098 0.0029 *** 0.0545 0.0328
DHFT  Resi_OI_lag1 0.0050 0.0037 0.0128 0.0046 ** 0.0776 0.0359 *
DHFT  Resi_OI_lag2 0.0089 0.0020 *** 0.0146 0.0042 *** 0.0868 0.0359 *
DHFT  Resi_OI_lag3 0.0137 0.0020 *** 0.0153 0.0044 *** 0.0438 0.0164 **
DHFT  Resi_OI_lag4 0.0141 0.0019 *** 0.0162 0.0054 ** 0.0390 0.0159 *
DHFT  Resi_OI_lag5 0.0155 0.0019 *** 0.0140 0.0042 *** 0.0508 0.0155 **
DHFT  Resi_OI_lag6 0.0123 0.0019 *** 0.0157 0.0040 *** 0.0595 0.0166 ***
DHFT  Resi_OI_lag7 0.0104 0.0017 *** 0.0172 0.0045 *** 0.0310 0.0133 *
DHFT  Resi_OI_lag8 0.0100 0.0017 *** 0.0161 0.0043 *** 0.0362 0.0144 *
DHFT  Resi_OI_lag9 0.0090 0.0016 *** 0.0076 0.0035 * 0.0515 0.0229 *
DHFT  Resi_OI_lag10 0.0095 0.0016 *** 0.0044 0.0032 0.0417 0.0347
Panel B: LOB sell slope
Intercept 0.0011 0.0020 0.0153 0.0037 *** 0.7459 0.0237 ***
DHFT 0.0157 0.0006 *** 0.0694 0.0018 *** 0.4031 0.0090 ***
Resi_OI_lag1 0.0371 0.0033 *** 0.0555 0.0080 *** 0.0721 0.0316 *
Resi_OI_lag2 0.0256 0.0035 *** 0.0502 0.0079 *** 0.0533 0.0223 *
Resi_OI_lag3 0.0186 0.0027 *** 0.0463 0.0078 *** 0.0366 0.0190
Resi_OI_lag4 0.0216 0.0021 *** 0.0410 0.0073 *** 0.0173 0.0088 *
Resi_OI_lag5 0.0211 0.0033 *** 0.0385 0.0072 *** 0.0045 0.0090
Resi_OI_lag6 0.0155 0.0016 *** 0.0304 0.0072 *** 0.0078 0.0089
Resi_OI_lag7 0.0128 0.0018 *** 0.0298 0.0063 *** 0.0079 0.0139
Resi_OI_lag8 0.0116 0.0016 *** 0.0271 0.0064 *** 0.0113 0.0132
Resi_OI_lag9 0.0109 0.0011 *** 0.0328 0.0074 *** 0.0063 0.0214
Resi_OI_lag10 0.0106 0.0012 *** 0.0188 0.0043 *** 0.0077 0.0198
DHFT  Resi_OI_lag1 0.0004 0.0034 0.0303 0.0083 *** 0.0668 0.0373
DHFT  Resi_OI_lag2 0.0007 0.0036 0.0303 0.0082 *** 0.0489 0.0295
DHFT  Resi_OI_lag3 0.0018 0.0028 0.0329 0.0080 *** 0.0362 0.0260
DHFT  Resi_OI_lag4 0.0094 0.0023 *** 0.0292 0.0075 *** 0.0225 0.0168
DHFT  Resi_OI_lag5 0.0114 0.0034 *** 0.0250 0.0074 *** 0.0076 0.0130
DHFT  Resi_OI_lag6 0.0079 0.0017 *** 0.0193 0.0075 ** 0.0073 0.0136
DHFT  Resi_OI_lag7 0.0052 0.0019 ** 0.0189 0.0065 ** 0.0181 0.0171
DHFT  Resi_OI_lag8 0.0053 0.0017 ** 0.0169 0.0065 ** 0.0168 0.0157
DHFT  Resi_OI_lag9 0.0043 0.0012 *** 0.0234 0.0075 ** 0.0059 0.0231
DHFT  Resi_OI_lag10 0.0045 0.0014 ** 0.0107 0.0045 * 0.0024 0.0219
This table reports estimates of the equation:
Slopet ¼
P116
j¼2Dj þ
P10
m¼1ResiOIti þ DHFT þ
P10
n¼1DHFT  ResiOItn þ ht: ð1Þ:
Order data on the Nasdaq markets of 116 stocks listed on the Nasdaq and NYSE are examined for the first quarter of 2011. Twenty-six HFT trading firms are
identified and the rest are non-HFT firms. Each trading day is divided into 10-s intervals. Slopet is the slope of the LOB at the end of each interval, which is
calculated by using buy or sell limit orders separately (see Table 5 for details). Dj are stock dummy variables. ResiOIt is the liquidity imbalance variable, which is
estimated as the residuals of the regression:
OIt ¼
P10
m¼1OIti þ ht .
For each time interval, the net buy (sell) limit order volume is the difference between total buy (sell) limit order volume submitted and total buy (sell) limit order
volume cancelled, while OIt is the difference between the net buy limit order volume and the net sell limit order volume. DHFT is a dummy variable that equals 1 if
the current Slopet is constructed by using limit orders of HFT firms, and 0 otherwise. Orders at the top 10 price levels are examined. All variables are standardized
by stock except for the dummy variables. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity following White (1980). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance
at 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively.
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27 For example, under MiFID II, “trading venues will be required to set
limits on the maximum number of order messages that a market participant
can send relative to the number of transactions they undertake.” Financial
Conduct Authority, 12/09/2014. URL: https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/
markets/international-markets/mifid-ii/what-is-changing. Accessed on May
25, 2015.
28
“Regulating high frequency trading,” Martin Whealey, Financial Conduct
Authority, speech on June 4, 2014. URL: http://www.fca.org.uk/news/
regulating-high-frequency-trading, accessed on 23 July 2015.
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in value and their magnitudes become closer to those of the
coefficients of lagged ResiOIt , which indicates that the impact
of the liquidity shocks on the limit order placement of HFT
firms quickly fades away. This is in direct contrast to the
impact of liquidity shocks on non-HFT firms, which generally
decreases but remains significant after 10 lags. The results in
Panel B are consistent with those in Panel A. These results
indicate that HFT firms are less affected and recover more
quickly following liquidity shocks than non-HFT firms.
Therefore, our results indicate that HFT liquidity providers
reduce the impact of liquidity imbalance shocks. This finding
is consistent with our previous results that HFT firms are better
informed and can more effectively manage risk when sup-
plying liquidity to the market.
3. Conclusions and policy implications
With the recent proliferation of HFT around the world, HFT
firms have largely taken the role of traditional market makers
(Jones, 2013). However, a large sample analysis of whether
HFT firms improve liquidity provision via their limit order
strategies has not yet been undertaken. Using a unique dataset,
we conduct a close examination of liquidity provision by a
group of HFT firms for 116 stocks traded on the Nasdaq. Our
results show the following:
 The order cancellation ratio, size and resting time on the
LOB are very similar between HFT and non-HFT limit
orders, indicating that HFT firms do not submit smaller
orders and do not cancel orders more frequently than non-
HFT firms.
 HFT firms strategically place and cancel limit orders in
anticipation of short-term price movements, which results
in their liquidity being more informed.
 HFT firms net increase the supply of liquidity during
market volatility.
 The impact of order imbalance shocks on HFT liquidity
provision is smaller and diminishes more quickly than that
on non-HFT liquidity provision.
Overall, our results indicate that as liquidity providers, HFT
firms enhance market quality.
There are important policy implications of our study.
First, our results clarify some commonly believed features
associated with HFT liquidity. The SEC Concept Release
2010 (p. 67) identifies five major characteristics attributed
to HFT firms that include the “submission of numerous or-
ders that are cancelled shortly after submission.” Our results
show that the limit order cancellation ratio is almost identical
between HFT firms and non-HFT firms. The sizes of limit
orders are also similar between the two groups. The average
time a limit order rests on the LOB is shorter for the limit
orders of HFT firms, but the absolute time to execution and
time to cancellation are also very short for non-HFT limit
orders and in many cases they are not much longer than those
of HFT firms. Overall, our results confirm the recentcomments of O'Hara (2015, p. 9) that “all trading is now fast,
with technological improvements originally attaching to
HFTs permeating throughout the market place,” and question
the effectiveness of some regulatory proposals targeting
HFT.27
Second, in the context of the CFTC/SEC report based on
the unusual May 6, 2010 flash crash, we provide new evi-
dence on HFT liquidity provision during normal market
conditions, which is important for an understanding of the
overall role played by HFT firms. The CFTC/SEC report
concludes that “it appears that the 17 HFT firms traded with
the price trend on May 6 and, on both an absolute and net
basis, removed significant buy liquidity from the pubic
quoting markets during the downturn.” However, Jones
(2013) argues that it is unrealistic to ask any market
makers to provide liquidity during such extreme and rare
market volatility. This brings into focus the role played by
voluntary market makers during normal trading conditions.
We find that HFT liquidity providers are better able to absorb
large order imbalances than non-HFT liquidity providers.
Our results also show that when providing liquidity, HFT
firms net increase the supply of liquidity when market
volatility increases.
Overall, our findings provide further perspective on the
regulation of HFTs. Malinova, Park, and Riordan (2013) and
Friederich and Payne (2015) examine the impact of new
market regulations which universally curb all HFT activities
and find that the net effect of such policies can be negative.
More recently Martin Wheatley, CEO of the Financial
Conduct Authority, states that “a priority challenge for HFT
specifically, which I'm not sure has yet been honestly assessed
by all players, is where the balance lies between the potential
benefits against costs.”28 Our study demonstrates that it is
important for market regulators to recognize the positive
impact of HFT on liquidity provision as documented in our
study while assessing the overall costs and benefits of HFT
regulation.Appendices
Appendix 1. Sample stocksAppendix 2. Limit order addition,
cancellation and execution by market capitalization As
the Table A2 demonstrates, our sample of HFT firms
contributes about 21% (small-cap stocks) to 37% (large
cap stocks) of total limit orders to the LOB, and the
percentage of total limit orders they cancel exhibits a
similar pattern. Interestingly, for both HFT firms and non-
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relatively stable across stocks of different market capi-
talizations. The order execution ratio is higher for large-
cap stocks than for medium- and small-cap stocks. ForTable A.1
Sample stocks. List of 116 securities in the final sample and their respective mark
Ticker symbol Market cap. (billions) Firm name
AA 16.14 Alcoa Inc.
AAPL 302.3 Apple Inc.
ABD 0.485 ACCO Brands Corp.
ADBE 15.92 Adobe Systems Inc.
AGN 21.36 Allergan Inc.
AINV 2.200 Apollo Investment Corp.
AMAT 18.79 Applied Materials Inc.
AMED 1.013 Amedisys Inc.
AMGN 52.48 Amgen Inc.
AMZN 82.68 Amazon.com Inc.
ANGO 0.390 AngioDynamics Inc.
APOG 0.394 Apogee Enterprises Inc.
ARCC 3.451 Ares Capital Corp.
AXP 52.24 American Express Co.
AYI 2.556 Acuity Brands Inc.
AZZ 0.510 AZZ Inc.
BAS 0.693 Basic Energy Services Inc.
BHI 24.71 Baker Hughes Inc.
BIIB 16.01 Biogen Idec Inc.
BRCM 20.19 Broadcom Corp.
BRE 2.822 BRE Properties Inc.
BXS 1.378 BancorpSouth Inc.
BZ 0.687 Boise Inc.
CB 18.37 Chubb Corp.
CBEY 0.478 Cbeyond Inc.
CBT 2.558 Cabot Corp.
CBZ 0.313 CBIZ Inc.
CCO 0.600 Clear Channel Outdoor Holdings Inc.
CDR 0.433 Cedar Shopping Centers Inc.
CELG 28.25 Celgene Corp.
CETV 1.205 Central European Media Enterprises Ltd.
FULT 2.083 Fulton Financial Corp.
GAS 2.294 Nicor Inc.
GE 195.4 General Electric Co.
GENZ 18.59 Genzyme Corp.
GILD 29.70 Gilead Sciences Inc.
GLW 29.99 Corning Inc.
GOOG 150.1 Google Inc. (Cl A)
GPS 13.65 Gap Inc.
HON 42.29 Honeywell International Inc.
HPQ 93.62 HewlettePackard Co.
IMGN 0.654 Immunogen Inc.
INTC 116.3 Intel Corp.
IPAR 0.585 Inter Parfums Inc.
ISIL 1.824 Intersil Corp. (Cl A)
ISRG 10.57 Intuitive Surgical Inc.
JKHY 2.534 Jack Henry & Associates Inc.
KMB 25.54 KimberlyeClark Corp.
KNOL 0.592 Knology Inc.
KR 14.00 Kroger Co.
LANC 1.616 Lancaster Colony Corp.
LECO 2.820 Lincoln Electric Holdings Inc.
LPNT 1.968 Lifepoint Hospitals Inc.
LSTR 2.028 Landstar System Inc.
MAKO 0.591 MAKO Surgical Corp.
MANT 0.963 ManTech International Corp. (Cl A)
MDCO 0.768 Medicines Co.
MELI 3.094 MercadoLibre Inc.large-cap stocks, the order cancellation ratios of HFT
firms are lower than those of non-HFT firms, but the
difference is economically small. The order execution
ratio of HFT firms for orders at the top three price levelset capitalizations on January 3, 2011 (billions).
Ticker symbol Market cap. (billions) Firm name
CKH 2.199 SEACOR Holdings Inc.
CMCSA 46.30 Comcast Corp. (Cl A)
CNQR 2.768 Concur Technologies Inc.
COO 2.606 Cooper Cos.
COST 31.33 Costco Wholesale Corp.
CPSI 0.512 Computer Programs & Systems Inc.
CPWR 2.571 Compuware Corp.
CR 2.452 Crane Co.
CRI 1.681 Carter's Inc.
CRVL 0.584 Corvel Corp.
CSCO 113.6 Cisco Systems Inc.
CSE 2.318 CapitalSource Inc.
CSL 2.469 Carlisle Cos.
CTRN 0.367 Citi Trends Inc.
CTSH 22.87 Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp.
DCOM 0.525 Dime Community Bancshares
DELL 26.62 Dell Inc.
DIS 71.62 Walt Disney Co.
DK 0.402 Delek US Holdings Inc.
DOW 40.60 Dow Chemical Co.
EBAY 37.39 eBay Inc.
EBF 0.452 Ennis Inc.
ERIE 3.383 Erie Indemnity Co. (Cl A)
ESRX 29.63 Express Scripts Inc.
EWBC 2.920 East West Bancorp Inc.
FCN 1.700 FTI Consulting Inc.
FFIC 0.451 Flushing Financial Corp.
FL 3.062 Foot Locker Inc.
FMER 2.210 FirstMerit Corp.
FPO 0.658 First Potomac Realty Trust
FRED 0.553 Fred's Inc.
MFB 0.574 Maidenform Brands Inc.
MIG 0.553 Meadowbrook Insurance Group Inc.
MMM 62.04 3M Co.
MOD 0.801 Modine Manufacturing Co.
MOS 33.98 Mosaic Co.
MRTN 0.480 Marten Transport Ltd.
MXWL 0.509 Maxwell Technologies Inc.
NC 0.743 NACCO Industries Inc. (Cl A)
NSR 1.945 NeuStar Inc. (Cl A)
NUS 1.894 Nu Skin Enterprises Inc. (Cl A)
NXTM 1.238 NxStage Medical Inc.
PBH 0.593 Prestige Brands Holdings Inc.
PFE 141.6 Pfizer Inc.
PG 183.8 Procter & Gamble Co.
PNC 32.32 PNC Financial Services Group Inc.
PNY 2.039 Piedmont Natural Gas Co.
PPD 0.610 Pre-Paid Legal Services Inc.
PTP 1.776 Platinum Underwriters Holdings Ltd.
RIGL 0.402 Rigel Pharmaceuticals Inc.
ROC 3.070 Rockwood Holdings Inc.
ROCK 0.423 Gibraltar Industries Inc.
ROG 0.633 Rogers Corp.
RVI 0.802 Retail Ventures Inc.
SF 2.217 Stifel Financial Corp.
SFG 2.136 StanCorp Financial Group Inc.
SJW 0.489 SJW Corp.
SWN 13.20 Southwestern Energy Co.
Table A.2
Limit order addition, cancellation and execution by market capitalization. This table reports the limit order volume cancelled and submitted by HFT and non-HFT
firms for each stock market capitalization group. The construction of this table is similar to that of Table 1. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 0.05,
0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively.
Top 3 Top 4 e 10 Top 11 e 20 All top 50 levels
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Section 1: Large-cap stocks
Order addition (shares)
HFT 176,932 278,141 39,643 80,577 6100 32,354 225,276 360,268
Non-HFT 305,745 3,337,019 134,742 149,002 28,804 47,965 487,022 3,358,491
Order cancellation (shares)
HFT 164,033 253,897 38,969 81,786 6668 33,195 212,641 340,670
Non-HFT 287,753 3,331,651 125,513 131,129 29,269 42,321 459,733 3,349,165
Cancellation ratio
HFT 0.4863 0.0199 0.4935 0.0712 0.5881 0.2384 0.4876 0.0154
Non-HFT 0.4894 0.0323 0.4883 0.0527 0.5288 0.1228 0.4880 0.0191
HFT e non-HFT 0.0031 *** 0.0004 ***
Execution ratio
HFT 0.0634 0.0506 0.0493 0.0411
Non-HFT 0.0897 0.0748 0.0435 0.0352
HFT e non-HFT 0.0263 *** 0.0058 ***
Section 2: Medium-cap stocks
Order addition (shares)
HFT 13,863 26,355 3412 5880 680 2120 18,228 31,518
Non-HFT 50,010 2,867,757 16,895 45,411 8748 27,623 82,839 2,870,873
Order cancellation (shares)
HFT 13,194 25,388 3399 5684 675 1977 17,545 30,533
Non-HFT 48,165 2,867,464 15,998 43,310 8341 26,795 79,582 2,870,590
Cancellation ratio
HFT 0.4878 0.0564 0.5200 0.1202 0.5417 0.2727 0.4920 0.0355
Non-HFT 0.4860 0.0390 0.5126 0.1045 0.5190 0.1387 0.4920 0.0293
HFT e non-HFT 0.0019 *** 0.0000
Execution ratio
HFT 0.0452 0.2910 0.0303 0.1467
Non-HFT 0.0594 0.0715 0.0275 0.0353
HFT e non-HFT 0.0142 *** 0.0028 ***
Section 3: Small-cap stocks
Order addition (shares)
HFT 4096 21,722 1477 2945 350 1150 5967 23,452
Non-HFT 15,332 83,409 4568 18,969 4794 12,907 26,293 94,805
Order cancellation (shares)
HFT 3924 21,577 1450 2787 346 1038 5763 23,247
Non-HFT 14,363 74,004 4805 21,397 4373 12,271 25,157 93,899
Cancellation ratio
HFT 0.4840 0.1149 0.5325 0.1763 0.5460 0.2619 0.4919 0.0782
Non-HFT 0.4816 0.0566 0.5432 0.1766 0.5178 0.1886 0.4916 0.0479
HFT e non-HFT 0.0025 *** 0.0003 ***
Execution ratio
HFT 0.0470 0.2538 0.0256 0.1485
Non-HFT 0.0678 0.3183 0.0354 0.2927
HFT e non-HFT 0.0207 *** 0.0098 ***
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ever, when we include all orders for the top 50 price
levels, the order execution ratios are similar. The results
for medium- and small-cap stocks also indicate that both
firms have similar order cancellation and order executionratios. These results are consistent with those reported in
Table 1.
Appendix 3. Intraday net liquidity provision
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Fig. A.1Intraday net liquidity provision. This figure depicts the intraday patterns of net liquidity provision of HFT and non-HFT firms on the Nasdaq markets for a
sample of 116 stocks listed on the Nasdaq and NYSE during the first quarter of 2011. The sample stocks are sorted by their market capitalizations on January 3,
2011, and divided into large (top 40 stocks), medium (medium 40 stocks), and small (final 36 stocks) size groups. Twenty-six HFT firms are identified traders and
the rest are as non-HFT firms. Limit orders submitted and cancelled are aggregated for each 15-min interval of the trading day. The net liquidity provision is the
difference between total limit order volume submitted and total limit order volume cancelled during each time interval. For each time interval, the figure shows the
average net liquidity provision of HFT and non-HFT firms as a percentage of their total daily average net liquidity provision.
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